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Introduction
Few artworks in the history of twentieth-century art have elicited such indignant and
visceral responses as those produced in Germany under Hitler and the Third Reich (1933–
45). The blatant propaganda and heinous ideology represented by the painting, sculpture,
architecture, and visual ephemera of this period have worked against its categorization as
art. The Nazi dictates on content and style–a naturalist-realism based on the servile copying
of nature or a photograph–demonstrably suppressed modernist and expressionist-oriented
creativity. Moreover, for the informed viewer, knowledge of the actual violence, and
genocide perpetrated by the regime endows the imagery with an aura of evil that both
fascinates and disturbs. Yet, the continued interest in the rise and fall of Nazi Germany
rests largely on the belief that the history of the Third Reich has lessons to impart not just
to subsequent generations of Germans, but also to the world at large. 1 The art produced
under National Socialism is crucial to those lessons. The history of its censorship and
reception in Germany over the postwar decades–the subject of this thesis–has larger
ramifications with regard to the ongoing contextualization and display of politically
charged art elsewhere in the world.
Images have always had the power to elicit profound emotional responses: from
adulation and desire to disgust, fear. In turn, the values we ascribe to cultural objects are
largely responsible for their fate.2 Paintings and sculptures deemed beautiful or innovative
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Eric Michaud, The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2004).
2 For a comprehensive analysis of the history of cultural relationships to images see,
David Freedberg’s, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
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are preserved for subsequent generations and the collective good under the definition of
cultural patrimony; those considered inconsequential are neglected; and those that provoke
loathing are overlooked, hidden, or destroyed. In his 2007 book The Power of Images,
David Freedberg wrote:
On some occasions, iconoclasm may seem chiefly to spring from a general
concern about the nature and status of images, about their ontology, and
about their function (or, indeed, the possibility of function). On other
occasions, one might claim, there seems to be less concern about ontology
(except, of course, among the artists), as in the French and Russian
revolutions. In other words, the motivation seems much more clearly
political. The aim is to pull down whatever symbolizes—stands for—the
old and usually repressive order, the order which one wishes to replace with
a new and better one.3
The fall of the Third Reich marked a period of intense iconoclasm, and the range of
emotional responses felt by military officers and later West Germans, as discussed in this
text, largely determined the fate of objects and the ensuing debates over their function as
patrimony and/or propaganda. In the immediate postwar period, the victorious Allies as
well as those who fell victim to National Socialism (or felt guilty for supporting it) aimed
to destroy the extant, visual embodiments of the regime’s oppression and terror.
Entnazifierung (denazification) laid the framework for ridding Germany of Nazi ideology.
The first part of denazification centered on culpability, with the Allies holding Nazi leaders
and party members accountable for their actions through tribunals and other legal actions.
The second part of denazification focused on purging all elements of Nazism from
Germany, including the destruction and removal of all visual signs and symbols of the
party, from art and literature to items of ephemera, in order to stop the perpetuation of
German militarism and Nazism. National Socialist visual culture promulgated the racist
and anti-democratic ideologies that led to Nazi genocide; its dogmatically anti-modernist
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Ibid., 389–90.
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style symbolized the totalitarian reach of the dictatorship and its violent repression of
creative freedom and civil liberties. The authorities believed, with reason, that the
exhibition of such images would reignite Nazi sympathies. A justifiable fear of the power
of Nazi art led to its concealment and destruction in the aftermath of World War II.
Countless buildings and reliefs bearing Nazi symbols were the targets of
spontaneous outbursts of iconoclasm. 4 An infamous photograph from the Mauthausen
Concentration Camp (figure 1) shows freed prisoners destroying a Reich eagle and
swastika atop the gates of the camp. The prisoners’ animus was not directed toward the
inanimate material object per se, but against its symbolism throughout the brutal Third
Reich. Iconoclasm is a cathartic gesture. Although not every German was a card-carrying
member of the Nazi party, many everyday Germans had been complicit with National
Socialism’s reign of terror, and after the end of the war they took to the streets and
destroyed Nazi emblems, symbols, and monuments in their cities. For example, in June
1945 numerous Nazi memorials were defaced across the city of Munich. Citizens
vandalized the Feldherrnhalle (Field Marshals' Hall) with graffiti and tore down and
demolished the adjacent Nazi memorials on the Odeonsplatz.5 The iconoclastic actions can
be ascribed to a sense of relief felt by Germans who were glad the war was over; they had
accepted their defeat. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch wrote in the The Culture of Defeat: On
National Trauma, Mourning, and Recover, conquered populaces often direct collective
consciousness towards hope and confidence. In this case, hope and confidence towards the
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A number of photographs from the Bavarian State Library photograph archive in
Munich show destroyed Nazi monuments. See, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
München/Fotoarchiv Walz, walz-0575. For additional lists of buildings destroyed in the
American zone, such as official lists of Nazi artworks removed from Munich city
property in 1946. See, Stadtarchiv Munich, BuR 2277.
5 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, “Interfoto/Friedrich Rauch. 00578725” and “Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek München/Fotoarchiv WAlz, walz-0575”
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future did not involve National Socialism and the vandals felt a sense of power and
hopefulness by defacing symbols of the former regime.6
Today, some seventy-five years after the fall of the Third Reich, one can visit a
municipal history museum in Germany and view a display of Nazi “memorabilia,” ranging
from postcards and pamphlets to painting and sculpture. How, in the wake of Germany’s
defeat at the hands of the Allied forces, did these materials survive into the present, and
how did they come to reside in museums? This thesis explores how some Nazi architecture,
fine arts and ephemera survived the postwar period, were gradually rehabilitated through
study and exhibition, and subsequently entered German museums to be publicly displayed
under the categories of historical documents and “visual culture,” rather than “fine” art.
The chapters flow chronologically in order to survey how collective memory and the
nation’s relationship to the Nazi past changed over time and with it, the study and reception
of National Socialist art.
The Allied occupation of Germany played an important role in both the destruction
and preservation of Nazi art and visual culture. Although much of the literature discussing
art and the occupation has focused on the restitution of artworks stolen by the Nazis, in
particular Lynn H. Nicholas’s seminal 1995 book The Rape of Europa: The Fate of
Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War, few texts have
addressed how these efforts ultimately protected and preserved the art created by the Reich.
In 1946, the American and British occupying governments established art depositories,
known as the Central Collection Points (CCP) to store artworks uncovered by their
restitution efforts. The U.S. and British militaries uncovered both hordes of art looted by

Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and
Recovery (New York: Picador, 2004), 10–11.
6
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the Nazis and troves of National Socialist paintings and sculpture. Both Nazi materials and
stolen masterpieces entered the CCPs. Although the Allies focused primarily on the
restitution of the stolen masterpieces in their care, they also formalized a unified plan (as
part of their denazification efforts) to destroy any propaganda materials that could be used
to perpetuate German militarism, including fine art. However, when it came time for the
destruction of the Nazi paintings and sculptures in the care of the U.S. CCP, some officers
argued for their preservation over iconoclasm. Many of the U.S. Military officials working
on the restitution efforts and in the CCPs were trained as art historians; they had been
recruited for their expertise. These officers made the case that the works in their care could
potentially hold historical and pedagogical value; they had the foresight to perceive that
one day the vilified artwork might be an instructive means for the study of why the Nazis
came to power and achieved a totalitarian state. Although the Allies worked together to
restitute stolen artworks, the approach in the Eastern and the Western zones towards Nazi
visual culture was vastly different. The Soviets helped identify and, in some cases,
provided locations of Nazi art to the Americans. However, due to the different approaches
taken by East and West Germany towards confronting the Nazi past in the years following
the occupation, a detailed discussion of Soviet involvement in the preservation of Nazi
visual culture is outside the scope of this thesis. As addressed in Chapter 1 of this thesis,
the U.S. occupation and the art historians working for the military were instrumental in the
preservation of Nazi art and instigated the line of reasoning for these materials to eventually
be considered as part of the national German patrimony.
In 1949, as a result of the Cold War, Germany was split into two. Aligned with
Europe and the United States, the West became the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany or the FRG), and the East, under the power of the Soviet Union, the German
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Democratic Republic (East Germany or the GDR). After this ideological, geopolitical, and
territorial division, little attention was paid to the art produced under Nazi Germany. The
two respective nations worked to distance their identities from the Nazi past. Under the
“anti-Fascist” rhetoric of Communist government directives, the GDR did not reckon with
its culpability until German reunification in 1990. The FRG, however, began a process of
collective reckoning and atonement in the 1960s, as part of the continued denazification.
Under the occupation, Entnazifierung (denazification) focused on holding Nazi
officials accountable for the genocide and atrocities committed. It also involved ridding
Germany of anything that could perpetuate German militarism. Nonetheless, holding all
involved in the mass atrocities proved difficult, as many Germans had been members of
the Nazi party or complicit with the Third Reich, but had not been directly involved in the
crimes against humanity. As a result, the Allies were unable to bring all perpetrators to
justice during the occupation (100,000 officials were held accountable). 7 Thus, in the
1950s, after Germany’s divide, many former Nazis returned to positions of power across
the FRG. Nevertheless, the Allied implementation of the denazification process, coupled
with the FRG’s new liberal democracy, resulted in a new collective consciousness: West
Germany engaged in Vergangenheitsbewältigung, “to come to terms with a traumatic
past.”8 Denazification gave West Germany a unique historical and political tenor, placing
collective consciousness, ideologically, at war with the immediate past, and it was
overwhelmingly difficult to reconcile the Third Reich with the new democratic Federal
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Jeffrey Herf, "Divided Memory Revisited: The Nazi Past in West Germany and in
Postwar Palestine." In Remembrance, History, and Justice: Coming to Terms with
Traumatic Pasts in Democratic Societies, edited by Tismaneanu Vladimir and Iacob
Bogdan C., 103-24. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2015.
Accessed November 21, 2020. doi:10.7829/j.ctt19z399m.7. 107.
8 Ibid.
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Republic. A uniquely West German phenomena, Vergangenheitsbewältigung changed
over time as intellectual and political life grappled with the crimes of the Third Reich.
A first moment of reckoning occurred with the 1956 scandal involving the Cannes
Film Festival’s decision to censor the documentary film Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog)
by French film director Alain Resnais. The film juxtaposed archival material of the
Holocaust with present day footage, ultimately removing a distinction between the Nazi
past and the present. The sense of distinction between past and present, which had been
championed by Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1963,
was further challenged by the highly publicized trial of the war criminal Adolf Eichmann
in 1961. Moreover, the veil of historical amnesia lifted even further in 1966 with the release
of the Nazi architect Albert Speer from Spandau prison. The student movements of the late
1960s further accelerated the demand for accountability. 9 West Germany’s interest in
reckoning with the recent Nazi past remained fraught during the 1960s because the
perception of victimhood extended beyond the groups explicitly persecuted by the regime:
many Germans believed that due to the traumas of war and postwar depravation they too
had suffered due to the Nazi regime. Moreover, former Nazis still held positions of
institutional power.
Within the cultural realm, generational change prompted a shift in the desire and
obligation to assess Nazi art and the complicity of artists, critics, dealers, and museum
curators. As former supporters of National Socialism retired from teaching and museum
positions, a younger generation of art historians emerged. They were too young to have
participated in the rise of the regime, sustained it, or to have fought in the war. They began
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Paul Jaskot, The Nazi Perpetrator: Postwar German Art and the Politics of the Right
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 6.
7

to bristle at the suppression of the past and wanted to understand the origins of the Nazi
mechanisms of power. Such new attitudes led to the publication of seminal texts such as
Hildegard Brenner’s 1963 Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus (The Art Policy of
National Socialism) and the first major postwar exhibition on the art and aesthetics of the
Third Reich: Kunst im 3. Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung (Art in the Third Reich:
Documents of Subjugation) mounted in 1974.10
This exhibition marked the first time since the fall of National Socialism that the
West German public was able to view–and confront–the visual culture of this reviled
period. Imagery depicting or referencing Nazism had been banned by the West German
government in 1956, when the FRG’s Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code) enacted section
86a. This law outlawed the use or display of symbols of “unconstitutional organizations,
"including National Socialism. However, there was a clause that allowed the display of
Nazi symbols “if the means of propaganda or the act serves to further civil enlightenment,
to avert unconstitutional aims, to promote art or science, research or teaching, reporting
about current historical events or similar purposes” –which thus allowed the organizers to
exhibit National Socialist images. 11 Organized by Georg Bussmann, director of the
Frankfurt Kunstverein; Berthold Hinz, assistant professor at the Institute for Art History,
University of Frankfurt; the academic and political scientist Iring Festscher; and a group
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Hildegard Brenner, Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus. Reinback bai Hamburg:
Rowohlt, 1963.According to study done by the Freie Universität Berlin many of
Hildegard Brenner’s primary sources for Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus came from
the Central State Archive in the GDR. See Freie Universität Berlin”About the Research
History.” Database “Entartete Kunst”. November 26, 2009. Accessed May 22, 2018.
http://www.geschkult.fuberlin.de/en/e/db_entart_kunst/geschichte/forschungsgeschichte/index.html.
11 Gerhard Dannemann, German Law Archive. Accessed November 11, 2020.
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=752#86a.
8

of art historians studying at the University of Frankfurt, it opened at the Kunstverein in
Frankfurt am Main in 1974, and traveled throughout the FRG, stopping in Hamburg,
Stuttgart, Ludwigshafen, Wuppertal-Elberfeld, and Berlin. Despite the presumed,
pervasive fear of Nazi images, the exhibition’s organizing committee believed that the
public needed to see and confront the art of the Third Reich. While scholars such as Pamela
Potter and Silke von Berswordt-Wallrabe note the importance of Kunst im 3. Reich:
Dokumente der Unterwerfung as a watershed in the evolution of collective memory, they
do not go into detail regarding the exact items in the show, the exhibition design, or the
critical reactions. 12 Chapter 2 documents these aspects and why the event provoked
controversy and heated debates about Nazi visual culture and its fate.13 The curators framed
the exhibition by correlating documents and propaganda imperative to specific visual
images; it was far too early and the methodologies did not yet exist for the public to
consider the easel paintings that were literally brought out of hiding for the show as both
“art” and propaganda.14 Scholars and some members of the general public overwhelmingly
agreed that Nazi art did not have a place in museums, because it was nothing more than
propaganda and many did not feel there was value in understanding how imagery had
served to promote Nazi ideologies.15
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Pamela Potter, Art of Suppression: Confronting the Nazi Past in Histories of the Visual
and Performing Arts. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016, 149 and Silke
Von Berswordt-Wallrabe, Jörg-Uwe Neumann, and Agnes Tieze, Artige Kunst: Kunst
und Politik im Nationalsozialismus (Bielefeld: Kerber, Christof, 2016), 196.
13 Georg Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung (Frankfurt
am Main: Zweitausendeins, 1980), 2.
14
George Bussman and Heinz Schütz, “Transformation Und Wiederkehr,” Kunstforum
International (1988): 99, accessed July 23, 2018,
https://kunstforum.de/lesen/artikel.aspx?a=095003.
15 Ibid., 204.
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Another decade followed before West Germany once again confronted its Nazi
past; new assessments towards Nazi visual culture developed from renewed debates
surrounding the role of Nazi art in the realm of aesthetics, despite the 1956 Criminal Code.
Chapters 3 and 4 look at critical developments in the 1980s, some fifty years after Hitler’s
rise to power in 1933. This decade marked an increasing tolerance toward Nazi visual
culture within the FRG and the United States. With the passage of time came distance from
the regime and those directly responsible for the crimes it perpetuated. Discussions
surrounding the validity of Nazi art and ephemera as items of high culture were revived
along with debates on the aesthetic value of Nazi visual culture.
In 1981 the United States decided to repatriate a number of National Socialist
artworks to the FRG. After years of review and careful selection, 6,100 works were
returned to the FRG in 1986.16 Although a number of scholars refer to the return of these
Nazi artworks in their texts on the history of the reception of Nazi imagery, they do not
document the machinations behind their return. Chapter 3 details the story of repatriation
efforts spearheaded by Republican Congressman G. William Whitehurst from Virginia,
who, after learning that a painting hanging in his office was made by a German soldier in
World War II, discovered and advocated for the return of the German War Art Collection.
This chapter sheds light on the provenance of Nazi art after the war. The U.S. involvement
in Germany at the end of the war and again in the 1980s-when these artworks were
repatriated to the Federal Republic, despite the later not requesting the return–demonstrates
how the United States preserved Nazi art and ascribed value on these works. Despite the

Andrew Decker, “Nazi Art Returns to Germany,” ARTnews 83, no. 9 (November
1984): 143–44.
16
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return of these works, the FRG did not wish to confront the imagery and instead opted to
store them away from the public in a warehouse in Bonn.
Chapter 4 considers the motivations of two private collectors, their markedly
opposed criteria for rehabilitating the art of the Nazi period, and the respective public
reactions to their endeavors. In 1986, the same year the repatriated works returned to West
Germany, debates erupted throughout the country regarding the aesthetic value of Nazi art.
At the center of the controversy were Peter Ludwig and his wife, Irene Monheim, who
made headlines that year when they commissioned Hitler’s favorite sculptor, Arno Breker
(1900-1991) to render their portrait busts. Ludwig believed Breker to be one of the greatest
living portrait artists and proposed that his busts should be housed in a museum in Cologne.
Ludwig’s actions were heralded or lambasted: supporters advocated that Breker’s neoclassicizing art deserved to be patronized on the basis of its aesthetic value, while others
protested that it was not only retrograde, but redolent of the Aryan racial discourse of the
Nazi era. Ludwig’s commission, and commentary that art should be removed from the
artist’s biography (he argued that Breker’s work should be judged on aesthetic quality
alone; the artist’s life or association with the Third Reich was irrelevant to the value of the
work), served as motivation for other supports to advocate for the rehabilitation of Breker’s
work. In the end, the two commissioned busts were not publicly shown in a museum in
Germany, and instead remained a part of Ludwig’s private collection until his death, after
which they were placed on long-term loan to the Ludwig Museum in Budapest, Hungary.
Ultimately, the controversy reinforced the anxiety around artists tied to National Socialism.
The incorporation of Nazi art within art museums could be seen as a form of moral
relativizing, of lessening the crimes of Nazism.

11

By contrast, across the Atlantic, an entirely new way of contextualizing politically
explosive material emerged under the rubric of “visual culture.” This methodology accepts
the didactic content of images and analyzes what makes them so compelling and
convincing. The collecting philosophy and acquisitions of one man in particular, Mickey
Wolfson, Jr., an American and Jewish philanthropist, elevated visual culture to the status
of “propaganda arts.” In contrast to Ludwig, who proposed that art and artists could be
appreciated apart from their political history, it was precisely history that informed
Wolfson’s desire to collect. The “art” of propaganda addresses the fundamental premise of
the power–and popularity–of images; it levels the hierarchy, casting an equal eye on
traditionally elite art forms (easel painting) and mass culture (mass produced and
disseminated, such as posters and postcards). Wolfson advocated for the study of
ephemeral items of mass culture in order to understand how aesthetics can function on all
levels, across mediums and vehicles of dissemination. For Wolfson, aesthetics and politics
were inextricably linked. The history of the acceptance of Wolfson’s collection in contrast
to the Ludwig controversy also demonstrates a broader global interest in the visual culture
of Nazi Germany.
The Berlin Wall fell and was destroyed on November 9, 1989; on October 3, 1990
the two Germanies were reunited. Unification resulted in greater access to historical
documents, the consolidation of resources and archives and the sharing of information (it
also resulted in the acquisition of a number of Nazi era materials). For example, in
December 1992, a delegation of German librarians and archivists met with forty Russian
librarians in Moscow to discuss archival materials and artworks brought to Russia after
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1945.17 During these meetings, Evgeny Kuzmin, a government official responsible for the
Russian Ministry of Culture’s library, provided German representatives with a list of books
and art objects that had been removed from Germany after 1945. These documents detailed
where and how these items had been disbursed and allowed for their repatriation to
Germany. Subsequent decades saw the establishment of new history museums, on local
and national levels, which included sections devoted to the Holocaust and to the Nazi
period. Once forbidden and vilified, posters, paintings, and sculptures of the Third Reich
have become, in the last two decades, mnemonic tools, brought into museum displays as
historical and pedagogical objects, didactic or “teaching” opportunities. Fear of the “power
of images” has been mitigated by historical distance and contextualization.

17

Sem C. Sutter, "The Fall of the Bibliographic Wall: Libraries and Archives in Unified
Germany," College & Research Libraries 55, no. 5 (1994): 403-11. Accessed March 11,
2018. doi:10.5860/crl_55_05_403.
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Chapter One: Points of Reckoning

When leafing through old photo albums, one encounters disturbing pictures
that have shaped the common image of the war’s end. These snapshots
rarely show actual fighting but present scenes of laughing victors and
celebrating civilians or of skeletons in concentration camp garb and
dejected prisoners of a defeated army. Other motifs capture broken bridges,
torn-up roads, blown-up tanks, burnt buildings, piles of rubble, and
anonymous bodies, representing an unimaginable level of destruction. The
old newsreels hardly show any men, only distraught women, orphans,
refugees, or the aged and the wounded. The yellowed photographs also
illustrate that life continued after the catastrophe through the clearing of
ruins, the creation of makeshift shelters, scrounging for food, and
fraternizing with the occupiers. These images have seared themselves into
the collective memory and dominate all recollections.
—Konrad H. Jarausch18

In the above passage, the American historian Konrad H. Jarausch attested to the misery
and ruins in which the German people found themselves when the European arena of World
War II ended in May 1945. Jarausch was born in Germany in 1941, in the city of
Magdeburg, which was largely destroyed by Allied bombing. Subsequently, the Allies set
to work building shelters and resettling the displaced. In addition to attending to these basic
conditions of human survival, the victors attended to the preservation of valuable art,
artifacts, and the few venerable historical monuments still standing. The complete
devastation of the country complicated their efforts to recover and restitute looted artworks
within Germany and in formerly German-occupied areas of Europe.
At the same time, the Allied powers aimed to locate and remove all administrative
structures and artistic items of Nazi origin. There was legitimate concern that ideologically
Konrad H. Jarausch, “1945 and the Continuities of German History: Reflections on
Memory, Historiography, and Politics,” in Stunde Null: The End and the Beginning Fifty
Years Ago, ed. Geoffrey J. Giles (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1997), 9.
18
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loaded, material things had the potential to stoke or revivify pro-Nazi sentiments,
accentuate the pain of the current devastation, and even foster violence. At first, censorship
and destruction were the presumed course of action. Having to confront these works in
tandem with the precious works of art that the Nazis had looted from other countries
intensified debates on the power and the innate value of images. Allied policies in the
immediate postwar years, as this chapter will document, determined how the fraught
artistic legacy of National Socialism would be evaluated and preserved in the following
decades. Emphasis on historical and pedagogical—if not artistic—importance, ultimately
guaranteed its survival.
Ironically, the immediate fate of disparaged Nazi art was linked to the German and
European cultural patrimony that was deemed invaluable. Even before the end of World
War II, the Allies made a substantial effort to protect the monuments, artworks, and
archives of historical and cultural significance located within combat zones. They
established specific government organizations to recover looted items and secure and
transport displaced and damaged art. The best known of the art protection agencies was the
American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments
in War Areas, also known as the Roberts Commission, established in 1943. 19 Directly
responsible for informing military personnel of the locations of objects to be secured and
saved, lest they be damaged or stolen, its purview included museum collections,
monuments, historic buildings, and libraries. Composed of a number of scholars, art
historians, collectors, and artists, the Roberts Commission compiled lists of artworks and
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culturally significant monuments and buildings, distributing this information to Allied
troops in order to help protect Europe’s heritage during combat. 20
Throughout the course of the war, the Allies established a variety of cultural
protection organizations, many of which overlapped in their personnel and tasks. These
included the Vaucher Committee (a multinational Allied art protection unit, founded in
1944); the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (which served as the centralized Allied
information agency on National Socialist art theft); and the Monuments, Fine Arts, and
Archives (MFAA) division (composed of American, French, and British members). 21 All
of these military units gathered maps, files, lists, and photographs documenting
monuments, collections, works of arts, and information on persons involved in German
looted art.22 These organizations centralized their findings before the end of World War II
at the Vaucher Committee’s London office, which existed until 1945. After 1945, the
Vaucher Committee formally disbanded and the Western Allies used the information
gathered by all of these organizations during the war to aid in their postwar restitution
efforts.
With the defeat of the Axis forces, the Allies concluded that they needed to
formulate both a political and cultural plan for Germany’s future, as these two concerns
were intertwined. The cultural front involved two opposing strategies of preservation and
censorship. On the one hand, they needed to recuperate looted artworks, including those

The Monuments Men Foundation, “American Council of Learned Societies,”
Monuments Men Foundation website, accessed May 20, 2018.
https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/the-heroes/american-council-of-learnedsocieties.
21 For information on the Vaucher Committee, see
https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11645559
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from Germany’s own esteemed historical past (even if the National Socialists had exploited
that past for their own goals). On the other, they feared the continued propagation of Nazi
ideology, including its bellicose and imperialist components that were so powerfully
expressed in the regime’s own art.
As David Freedberg argued in The Power of Images: Studies in the History and
Theory of Response, the ability of paintings and sculptures to provoke a range of emotional
reactions–from veneration to anger–derives from their association with a specific creator,
regime, or location.23 Indeed they may be said to embody or emanate the aura of those
people, spaces, and moments, and hence, collective memories. In postwar Germany certain
monuments, spaces, and decorations were believed to function as still active agents of
National Socialism; they represented a national spirit and ambition, as well as international
calamity and the murder of tens of millions. By removing, altering, or destroying them, the
military governments eradicated the lingering power of the Nazi regime, and did so with a
violence both physical and symbolic.
At the Yalta Conference of February 1945, the Allies agreed that Germany would
be split into zones of occupation to ensure denazification and demilitarization. 24 The
country was divided amongst the USA, USSR, France, and Britain, with each possessing
equal power and the ability to form their respective military governments (figure 2). 25 That
same year these countries established the Allied Control Council in Berlin to coordinate
their policies.26 The Control Council granted the occupiers equal authority and served as
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the base of operations for the Allied occupation. 27 The American version of the Control
Council’s founding documents proclaimed:
The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again
becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essentials steps in the
accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and
militarism in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals
for punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of
Germany, with continuing control over Germany’s capacity to make war,
and the preparation for the eventual reconstruction of German political life
on a democratic basis. 28
The Control Council documents also laid out the scope of denazification, which was to
dissolve “the Nazi Party, its formations, affiliated associations and supervised
organizations, and all Nazi public institutions which were set up as instruments of Party
domination,” and prohibit “their revival in any form.”29 Further to this effort, it read: “all
archives, monuments and museums of Nazi inception, or which are devoted to the
perpetuation of German militarism, will be taken under your [Allied] control, and their
properties held pending decisions as to their disposition by the Control Council.” 30 The
laws sanctioning the eventual destruction of these properties were officially enacted in
1946. Already in June 1945, for example, the United States military government ordered
all Nazi symbols and references to National Socialism removed from public spaces in their
zone, including carved eagles and swastikas that adorned building facades and interiors. 31
Considering fine arts and mass-produced printed matter one and the same kind of
heinous propaganda, the Allies agreed that they would need to rid Germany of these
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dangerous items.32 The Central Collecting Points (CCP). created to collect, catalogue, and
save valuable European artworks that had been looted and damaged soon served a double,
and contrary, purpose. The artworks sent to them and temporarily housed for protection
quickly expanded in numbers to include National Socialist material destined for
destruction. 33
The manner in which the Allies treated Nazi heritage during the postwar partition
and occupation profoundly affected the German collective memory. While each of the
allied, victorious powers engaged in iconoclasm—destroying buildings, monuments,
artworks, and other items of Nazi origin—there came a point when the French, British, and
Americans realized that some historical value resided in the confiscated Nazi fine arts and
ephemera. The Soviet involvement in the preservation of Nazi fine art during the
occupation is difficult to ascertain. While the Control Council documents, signed by the
USSR, demonstrate that the Soviets agreed with the Western Allies on the censorship of
Nazi fine art and ephemera, information about the fate of Nazi materials within the eastern
zone is not readily available. Nonetheless, documents came to light after the fall of the Iron
Curtain indicating that some items of National Socialist visual culture were censored but
ultimately preserved by the Soviet government. 34
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Germany in Ruins: Repurposing an Unusable Past
From May 1942 to the end of the war in May 1945, Allied military strategy focused on the
bombing of cities in an effort to bring the Third Reich to its knees. 35 Housing, roads,
railroads, industrial sites, and cultural monuments were the targets of aerial attacks. 36
British and American firebombing left small cities such as Jülich and Düren completely
leveled, while major centers such as Berlin, Bremen, Cologne, Hamburg, and Hanover
were largely reduced to mounds of debris. 37 Four hundred million cubic meters of rubble,
including the remains of nearly three million of the sixteen million apartments that existed
before the war, accumulated in West Germany alone. 38 An additional four million
apartments were so extensively damaged they were deemed useless. 39 The Roberts
Commission had provided maps of cultural centers to the British and American troops in
an effort to protect as much cultural heritage as possible. 40 Nevertheless, the bombing
destroyed eighty percent of historic buildings in the major cities, and the treasures and/ or
bombastic Nazi décor within. 41
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Numerous case studies, such as Jeffry M. Diefendorf’s essay “The New City:
German Urban Planning and the Zero Hour,” have been devoted to the extensive damage. 42
Diefendorf details the destruction of Cologne, which was on the receiving end of a
thousand-bomber air raid on May 31, 1942, as well as the last great air raid of March 2,
1945.43 The latter assault destroyed most of the buildings still standing in the inner parts of
the city, save the cathedral, which was severely compromised. 44 When on March 6, 1945,
the Americans seized Cologne—a city that had remained under artillery fire for the
previous four weeks—seventy percent of the city’s 250,000 dwellings had been destroyed
or severely damaged, and twenty-four million cubic meters of rubble filled the ruined
city.45 Those who lived through the war estimated that forty thousand people had died in
Cologne during the air raids, but the real number was much less and closer to fifty-five
hundred.46
Given the lack of infrastructure and housing, architecture—salvaged, rebuilt, or
new—became a focus of Allied resources. The preservation and immediate use or
conversion of standing buildings became part of the discussion regarding the threat of Nazi
visual culture to the reconstruction–physical and moral–of postwar Germany. While the
fate of many buildings constructed during the Third Reich, such as the Nazi party
administration buildings in Munich, was demolition, others ultimately served purposes
important to the occupying powers. The military governments converted them into
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administrative centers or, due to a lack of resources, utilized them within their existing
functions.
A key example was the Tempelhof Airport, which had been built in 1923, had
undergone extensive renovations during the Third Reich, and had survived the war intact.
Tempelhof became critical for the American occupation of Berlin because it was located
close to the city and still functioned as an airport. In order to purge the site of associations
with Nazi Germany, the American Military removed from the facade all traces of National
Socialist relief elements, including a large stone eagle. 47 The intended effect was to
“cleanse” the building of all associations with the regime and deter any revival of pro-Nazi
sentiments. By removing the visual traces of Nazism, the foreign victors were making
tangible the conditions of Germany’s unconditional surrender and visually reinforcing the
Allied power over the Germans. 48
In The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery,
Wolfgang Schivelbusch writes that when authoritarian regimes of the early twentieth
century were finally defeated, the anger of the conquered population toward the victors
quickly dissipated.49 The former enemy was no longer an adversary, but became, instead,
a benevolent force in rebuilding, directing the collective consciousness toward the future
with hope and confidence.50 On July 23, 1945, the American Military Government issued
a directive requiring all streets, parks, institutions, and buildings named after Nazi objects
or party members to be changed. By then, however, German anti-Nazi groups had already
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begun to follow the spirit of that decree on a smaller scale, defacing Nazi insignias on
memorials and monuments, and tearing down street signs. 51 For example, in June 1945,
citizens of Munich covered the east side of the Feldherrnhalle with graffiti and tore down
various Nazi memorials throughout the city. 52
When the Americans had entered Munich—the birthplace of National Socialism—
on April 30, 1945, the city had been largely destroyed. A majority of the city’s cultural
centers suffered severe damage, including the Alte and Neue Pinakothek museums
(although their precious contents had been carefully stored and protected). 53 Yet, the Haus
der Deutschen Kunst (HDK), designed by one of Hitler’s favored architects, Paul Ludwig
Troost, remained intact thanks to camouflage netting that had been put in place in
September 1942 and successfully protected it from air raids. 54 Because the building had
cooking facilities and a relatively enormous amount of space, the American military
converted it into barracks and an officers’ club. 55
Hitler commissioned the Haus der Deutschen Kunst, located on the southern edge
of Munich’s Englischer Garten, with the intent to showcase contemporary paintings and
sculpture that were commissioned and approved by the Nazi party as harbingers of a new
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German Renaissance. Most infamously, the museum began in 1937 to host the annual
Großen Deutsche Kunstausstellungen (Great German Art Exhibitions) (GDK), the most
important exhibition and venue for the sale of German art during the Nazi period. This
museum, with its Neoclassical style that asserted the Aryan lineage of the German people,
was also home to numerous Nazi party celebrations and other National Socialist activities.
In 1947 the Haus der Deutschen Kunst appeared on a list of historic museums slated
for protection and preservation due to its historical and cultural significance. 56 United
States military documents do not explain why the building appeared on this list. One reason
might have been that the museum’s Nazi associations were deemed less important in
comparison with the premium placed on usable buildings. The paucity of resources in the
postwar period necessitated a blind eye when it came to re-purposing existing regime
structures. It may also be surmised that because the Pinakothek museums had suffered
severe damage, the Americans decided it was prudent to preserve the Haus der Deutschen
Kunst and its function in their cultural rehabilitation program.57 For example, starting in
1946 the Americans moved a number of old masterworks, formerly housed in the Alte
Pinakothek, into the west wing of the Troost building, at which time the public began
referring to the museum as the Haus der Kunst, removing the nationalistic Deutschen from
its name.58 Other Nazi cultural centers were also preserved as part of the Allied postwar
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cultural rehabilitation program. In 1948 the Führerbau became the America House—a
still-extant cultural center dedicated to promoting democracy and strengthening GermanAmerican relations. The Nazi Party Administration Building was converted into the
Munich Central Collection Point. Other prominent Nazi buildings in Munich had survived,
notably the entire Königsplatz or NSDAP district; but in this case, unlike the Haus der
Kunst, the Americans demolished the two memorials to fallen party members, the
Ehrentempel (Temples of Honor), there in 1947.59
As in the Western zones, the Soviets also converted former Nazi buildings into
administrative centers, for example, the former Reich Ministry of Aviation in Berlin. A
highly symbolic edifice, the Reich Ministry was one of Hitler’s first building projects,
begun in 1935 after Paul von Hindenburg appointed him chancellor. 60 Hermann Göring
directed the German Air Force from this site, which played a prominent role throughout
World War II. Soon after Germany’s defeat, however, the building served an important
administrative function for Soviet politics. In 1947 the German Economic Commission
was founded at this location, operating as the central administrative organization for the
Soviet occupation. In 1949 it became a ceremonial site for the signing of the documents
which established the German Democratic Republic. By 1950 the Soviets had renamed the
former Reich Ministry the House of Ministries, and the building housed the cabinet and
chief executive body of the GDR until German reunification in 1989.61

59

NS-Dokumentationszentrum, Exhibition information: Investigating the Nazi Period,
28-33. 2015. NS-Dokumentationszentrum archives, Munich.
60 Federal Ministry of Finance, “History of the Detlev Rohwedder Building: Federal
Ministry of Finance; About,” Bundesministerium Der Finanzen website, accessed
January 20, 2019.
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Ministry/History/d
etlev-rohwedder-building.html.
61 Ladd, Ghosts of Berlin, 146.
25

The Allies and German Patrimony
During the war German citizens and government officials aimed to protect their
possessions and cultural heritage from looting and aerial bombardments. They moved
many artworks to safer locations, generally underground. In the postwar period, British and
American MFAA officers searched German and Austrian towns and cities for missing
inventory, especially for objects that had been evacuated from Germany’s national
museums and the occupied territories. MFAA officers interrogated Nazi officials and
civilians in their efforts to locate the storage areas. No one could have imagined the
astounding number of repositories uncovered, nor the conditions of the sites. For example,
the Heilbronn mine hoard, located in Baden-Württemberg, contained 393 uncrated
paintings and an additional nearly 4,000 artworks and objects. 62 By 1947 the Allies were
still discovering art repositories in Germany at a rate of thirty per month. 63
The American, French, and British militaries worked together to catalogue and
restitute the artworks they uncovered to their rightful owners and countries of origins.64
Nonetheless, these efforts were not always successful: many of the Jewish families whose
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art collections were pillaged by the Nazis had lost their lives in the Holocaust and war.
Others were exiled and displaced. In order to administer, preserve, and record the recovered
artworks, the British and American military governments formed the Central Collecting
Points. The American military took the lead in determining the best regional locations for
these centers, which were established in Baden-Württemburg, Frankfurt, Kassel, Marburg,
Darmstadt, and Munich. 65 The British meanwhile used a former castle located in the city
of Celle to store over two hundred damaged works that had belonged to the Berlin National
Gallery.66
The largest of the Central Collection Points was located in the American zone,
along the Königsplatz in Munich, in the former Nazi Party Administration Building and
Führerbau. 67 The American military appointed the American art historian Craig Hugh
Smyth as the first director of the Munich CCP. There he employed art historians, librarians,
and photographers from the United States and those from Germany who had cleared
denazification questionnaires and did not have any extensive involvement with the Nazi
party.68 Under Smyth’s guidance, Munich CCP staff implemented a property card system
for documenting the objects in their possession and identifying potential owners. As soon
as an object had been inventoried and the provenance confirmed, the MFAA began their
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restitution efforts.69 Because there was such an extensive array of items in the care of the
CCP, not all individual artworks and artifacts made it into inventories, and many items
were subsequently looted by thieves, both civilian and military, from the centers. 70
Not all artworks and cultural items that entered the Munich CCP had been acquired
as part of the restitution program, which restricted itself to artworks looted by the Nazis or
seized from Jews under Aryanization laws. When the Americans took control of the Haus
der Kunst, officers discovered thousands of artworks that had been shown at the annual
Großen Deutsche Kunstausstellungen (Great German Art Exhibitions) (GDK) on the
premises.71 These artworks included submissions from the final GDK in 1944, as well as
unclaimed works from the other editions, which had started in 1937. Among the paintings
and sculptures uncovered were those sold to the German Labor Front and other Nazi party
organizations such as the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. 72 The
MFAA took control of these now tainted artworks and brought them to the Munich CCP,
where staff photographed and gave them inventory numbers.73
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The Debate over the Fate of Nazi Art
Although the Allied Control Council agreed that all items of Nazi origin had to be removed
from the public sphere, they had not considered what they would then do with them. Each
of the military governments dealt with these undesirable spoils of war in a variety of ways:
some of these material artefacts were removed from view, others destroyed. Different and
immediate ad hoc responses resulted within each of the occupied zones. Perhaps the most
complex and historically significant fracture that led to the preservation of the largest hoard
of National Socialist visual culture was the one that occurred between the American
Military and the Control Council. Unlike the French or British militaries, the United States’
War Department felt there was a void in the Control Council’s valuation of some
confiscated Nazi properties and eventually placed historical significance on a number of
their spoils.74
In June 1945, United States Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson established the
Historical Properties Division of the Army Headquarters of the United States Military. 75
The Historical Properties Division collected war-related items with the intent that these
objects and artworks would eventually be displayed in the Pentagon as spoils of war.76 A
memorandum established the division’s objectives:
[The object of this division is] to provide for the collection, processing,
preservation, and control of war paintings, photographs, maps, trophies,
relics, and objects of actual or potential historic interest or value produced
during the present war. . . It is contemplated that, pending decision as to the
ultimate disposition of these properties, such items as may possess
decorative or cultural values may be suitably displayed in The Pentagon and
other War Department buildings in the Washington Metropolitan Area.
Such material as may be approved for these purposes by the War
74

Ibid.
John Paul Weber, The German War Artists. Columbia, SC: Cerberus Book, 1979. 16.
76 Ibid.
75

29

Department Bureau of Public Relations may be made available to publishers
of books, magazines, and newspapers for reproduction…77
The memorandum set a legal precedent for the potential preservation of Nazi art and visual
culture on the grounds that war paintings were being collected for historical and
educational purposes. As expressed in the directive’s proclamation, some materials would
be exhibited in the Pentagon, and, furthermore, others could be approved for reproduction
and circulation. On November 7, 1945 the War Department issued a memo to U.S.
Commanding Generals stationed in Europe explaining what they meant by war paintings
or objects of actual or potential historic interest, including mediums and subject matter:
[We] Request you collect all available paintings, watercolors, engravings,
and drawings showing troop activities, view of battle fields, military
installations, industrial home front activities produced by German and
Italian artist[s] during present war. Ship to Historical Property Section,
Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, Room 2 B 328 the
Pentagon.78
Despite what the Historical Properties Division of the U.S. Army set out to do, the Allied
Control Council contradicted their orders six months later on May 13, 1946, when they
issued Directive No. 30, which legalized the requisitioning of any Nazi-era item and the
fate of these materials. 79 The Control Council declared that all symbols of German
militarism and National Socialism had to be removed from public view by January 1,
1947. 80 Furthermore, the directive established that “all publications and material
mentioned in this order shall be placed at the disposal of the Military Zone Commanders
for destruction.” 81 While the Control Council did not establish the exact means of
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destruction, it was subsequently left to German officials from across the Western zones to
inventory artworks and monuments created under the Third Reich and formulate for their
removal. They then presented these plans to the Allied authorities, who issued a time frame
for their implementation and completion. In order to reinforce the directive, the Control
Council established that if the local governments did not comply, their disobedience would
constitute a crime, for which the Allies would decide the sanction. 82 Thus, local city
governments carried out the removal and destruction of National Socialist materials. 83
For example, on November 30, 1946, the director of Munich’s city art collection
presented United States military government officials with a list of 117 sculptures (mainly
bronze busts of Nazi officials), 105 paintings, and a tapestry (depicting a Reich eagle with
a swastika and wreath), objects that had been removed from various sites across the city,
such as the Lenbachhaus Gallery, city government offices, and school classrooms. 84 As per
the Control Council’s decree, the destiny of these materials fell into the hands of local
government officials who were instructed by the officials from the United States military
to destroy all items containing Nazi sentiments.85 Records detailing the total number of
items purged within the zones and the manner through which artworks were destroyed are
scarce, evincing both the large number of items confiscated and the low esteem in which
this “art” was held by Allied officers and their German counterparts.
Despite the iconoclasm in response to Directive no. 30 and the general consensus
among the Allies that Nazi imagery lacked artistic merit, not all Nazi fine art fell under its
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purview. For example, the MFAA staff at the Munich CCP largely ignored the Control
Council’s directive and instead focused on the directives from the United States’ Historical
Properties Division–which placed some value on visual culture. Although there were
concerns about the incendiary propagandistic value of the imagery made under National
Socialism, the officers stationed at the Munich CCP reviewed the Nazi artworks they
collected and either kept some as part of the Historical Properties Division memo to collect
war-related items, or in some cases offered to return works (probably those not representing
scenes of war) to the makers. For example, a number of artworks from the Great German
Art Exhibitions had been found in the HDK, and in some cases the MFAA staff contacted
artists determined to have survived the war and offered to return the artworks to their
makers—provided the artwork was free of any explicit Nazi propaganda and that the
individual had passed a denazification questionnaire (a 131 question survey used by the
Allies to determine an individual’s level of involvement in National Socialism).86 This act
suggests that certain military personnel perceived a kind of inherent value in the works
and, at a minimum, in the craft and labor of an individual’s hand. Significantly many of
these artists demurred when offered back their works: they had neither the money nor the
desire to pay the shipping costs. 87 In most cases they asked the MFAA officers to destroy
their objects, likely a means of concretely and symbolically disavowing their personal past
and connection to a tainted epoch in national history.88 Others perhaps did so out of fear.
With few takers, means of exposition, or institutional storage, this body of art remained
stranded, notwithstanding its increasing aura of taboo. Thus, many of these items remained

86

Ibid.
Lauterbach, Der Central Collecting Point in München, 164.
88 Ibid.
87

32

hidden at the Central Collection Points until their fate could be determined (as will be
discussed).
In May 1946—as German government officials were rounding up National
Socialist visual propaganda and MFAA officer working at the Munich CCP were
contacting artists regarding the return of their art from the HDK—the Historical Properties
Division of the United States Military assigned Captain Gordon W. Gilkey as chief of the
newly established German Wartime Art Program. 89 The German Wartime Art Program
was established as a part of and in response to the aforementioned Historical Properties
Division objective to collect, process, preserve, and control war paintings, photographs,
maps, trophies, relics, and objects of actual or potential historical interest. 90 Due to the
various orders from the U.S. Military branches and Control Council, coupled with the
number of tasks asked of the officers, the Historical Properties division found that no
substantial German war art had entered into their care. Thus, they felt the need to establish
a specific German War Art Program in order to ensure they achieved their objective.
Colonel Clanton W. Williams, Chief Historian, Air Force and Major Hermann W.
Williams, Jr. (a former curator of paintings at The Metropolitan Museum of Art and
Director of the Corcoran Gallery in Washington D.C.) both referred Captain Gordon W.
Gilkey for the job due to his military service and background as an art teacher and artist
(figure 3).91
By the end of 1946, after seven months of investigation, Captain Gilkey had
identified approximately 10,000 paintings and sculptures of bellicose, militaristic, or
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propagandistic content, mostly located in South German art depots and at the Munich
CCP.92 The list enumerated the remaining artworks recovered from the HDK, Bad Aussee
in Austria, and former NSDAP buildings, including artworks from the basement of the
Führerbau in Munich, private collections of Nazi officials such as Göring and Hitler, and
the traveling SS war art show organized by Heinrich Himmler.93 While the subject of many
of the paintings and watercolors were Hitler and other prominent military figures, others
included depictions of young soldiers and youthful women carrying Nazi banners—just a
few of the most obsequious nationalistic typologies encouraged by the Third Reich. 94 At
this time, no documents exist that record whether the American military was aware of the
racist content behind the depiction of blond-haired, fair-skinned Germans. Such
sophisticated, if obvious, analysis would take decades to undertake.
After he completed his investigation, Gilkey organized an exhibition of German
war art demonstrating the work he had done on behalf of the Historical Properties
Division’s German War Art Program (figure 4). He had confiscated 8,722 works of art, but
only a fraction of them were selected for the exhibition.95 Gilkey outlined his reasoning in
his journal, stating:
I selected 103 war pictures and placed them in the Frankfurt a/Main Staedel
Museum for an exhibition of German war art. On 6 December 1946, at 1100
hours, General Joseph T. McNarney, Commanding General, United States
Forces, European Theater, and Colonel Harold E. Potter, Chief, Historical
Division, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, prevued
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[previewed] the exhibition. During the afternoon of the same day, press
representatives and photographers from the major syndicates in the United
States were escorted through the exhibit. From 7 December 1946 through
15 December 1946, the museum was open to American and Allied
personnel. Fifteen hundred people accepted the promise of no heat or lights,
during the cold weather at that time, to see the exhibit, which was placed in
the three remaining rooms with four walls in the bombed building. 96
Captain Gilkey further noted that many of the works were created during the war by
German officers who drew and painted scenes of war and combat during their downtime
at the front. Army commanders then sent these works to various Nazi organizations for
display and potential review by the Führer.97 Throughout his inquiry Gilkey recorded his
findings on the extensive program of war art inside the Third Reich, only occasionally
reviewing the techniques and subject matter of the works he collected. According to
Gilkey’s journal, combat artists were required to record foreign locations and people and
lacked any sense of creative freedom–most likely because of the totalitarian Nazi cultural
policies.98 Within his writings, Gilkey does discuss his conversations with German war
artists, giving occasional quotes. For example, Gilkey interviewed, artist Luitpold Adam,
a prominent member of the Frontkämpferbundes bilder Künstler (Front Fighters
Association of Fine Artists), who had been appointed head of the Gruppe Maler-und
Pressezeichner in der Propaganda-Ersatzabteilung (Painter Group and Press Signs in the
Propaganda Replacement Department) in Potsdam in 1941. In the interview, Adam stated
that he and another artist believed that war art conveyed the “war’s episodical and lyric
moments.”99 Gilkey did not comment on his opinions of this sentiment and simply recorded
it as an anecdote relating to the history of these artworks. Towards the end of his journal
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Gilkey assessed how the artworks embodied the totalitarian belief system of Nazi culture,
noting:
Perhaps combat artists were sincere, working artists are simple people. But
behind it always was Adolf Hitler and the men around him…Hitler
advocated freedom in art, but freedom only within the small scope of what
he personally approved (and what the majority of the Germans understood)
– monumental realism. All else was “degenerate and verboten.”…A
blindfold was placed on the borders of Germany to keep German people
free from contamination and influence of contemporary culture and
progressive creative movements on other lands. A good beginning of
German Expressionism in art was declared degenerate and verboten. A
generation of German was brought up in cultural ignorance. A generation
of Germans assumed responsibility for the destruction of the best of all their
precursors… German art became a tool to spread the manure of Nazism and
Nazi directed German Militarism. 100

In sum, Gilkey believed that National Socialism, with its ardent nationalism, could only
produce artworks made in the style of a bombastic realism and lacked a sense of artistic
creativity–associated with individual autonomy.
Captain Gilkey’s project and subsequent museum show prompted discussions
among military officials and cultural historians on the power and judgment of Nazi visual
culture and led to a reconsideration of its fate. Indeed, after the close of the German War
Art exhibition in September 1947, the director of the Munich CCP, Herbert S. Leonard,
found himself staunchly resisting the Control Council’s policy of destruction, apparently
informed by discussions with others: “It is the feeling among those historians here that
these materials should not be exhibited or seen, but further that it should not be considered
as the act of vandalism [to] deprive future generations of making a full and just estimate of
the Nazi character, spirits, and times.” 101 While military personnel and historians did not
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(openly) argue for any inherent aesthetic quality of this art, they did consider it, for better
or worse, historical material culture and hence, patrimony—an educational tool, if nothing
else. Furthermore, they acknowledged the role of temporal and geographical distance in
potential reevaluation. Gilkey’s pedagogical approach, and the opinion forwarded by
Leonard, resulted in the preservation of Nazi painting and sculpture that encompassed more
than what the Historical Properties Division had set out to collect. Leonard’s inability to
follow the policies set forth by the United States Government eventually led to his
dismissal as head of the Munich CCP in 1949. 102 Gilkey and Leonard nonetheless managed
to preserve all 8,772 Nazi artworks, orchestrating their transportation to the United States
in 1947. Once in the United States, a majority of those items with incendiary subject matter
remained censored in the collection storage facilities at the United States Army Center for
Military History in Washington, DC; nonetheless a selection of military scenes were
eventually displayed inside the Pentagon until the 1980s.103

Continued Censorship of Nazi Fine Art and German Steps toward Atonement
Although the objects collected by the U.S. Military did not enter into the public purview in
the United States, some former MFAA Officers and soldiers returned to America and
openly discussed the Nazi artworks they saw during their time in Germany. For example,
in 1945, the American writer Lincoln Kirstein penned the article "Art in the Third Reich –
Survey, 1945," published in the Magazine of Art in October 1945.104 Unlike Gilkey, whose

102

Lauterbach, Der Central Collecting Point in München, 64.
Ibid., 164. The subject of the removal of these artworks from the Pentagon and other
government offices is the subject of chapter three.
104 Lincoln Kirstein, “Art in the Third Reich – Survey 1945.” Magazine of Art, October
1945, 223-40.
103

37

journal served to document what he uncovered and how to report it to his commanding
officers, Kirstein's article, written for a larger audience, underscored how elements of Nazi
art reflected the atrocities committed by the Third Reich.
To begin with, when discussing the history of the Great German Art Exhibitions,
Kirstein argued that the visual narratives depicted in Nazi painting represented an idealized
world that deliberately avoided the harsh realities of their actual time and place. Indeed,
he noted how the style of Nazi painting and sculpture was deliberately out of time, a throwback to the neo-classicism or realist naturalism of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the
imagery of the artworks, he wrote, was “beauty-parlor mask for murder.” 105 This statement
could be inferred as a veiled reference to the concentration camps, with National Socialist
paintings serving as propaganda to support the grotesque extermination of the Jews, Roma,
and other “degenerate” people who did not adhere to the pseudo-criteria defining the Aryan
race. Kirstein analyzed stylistic elements of stereotypical Nazi sculpture including the
frozen, overly masculine–almost pornographic (or homoerotic)–nudes of Josef Thorak and
Arno Breker.106 His discussion of the of the Nazi representations of the ideal, human body
alluded to the regime’s eugenics programs. Kirstein’s analysis exemplifies how, in the
immediate postwar period, those familiar with the atrocities of the Third Reich saw them
directly expressed within the art dictated under its auspices. 107 Kirstein, like Gilkey,
believed that Nazi fine art was devoid of any imagination or ingenuity–a result of what he
believed was a restricted and insidious program of cultural propaganda.
Kirstein and Gilkey’s assertion that the Nazi totalitarian cultural system led to
uninspired and oppressed art was not unique to them; it was a belief largely held by the
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Western Allies. After the war, the victors believed that they needed to reshape the German
cultural sphere, and thus introduced exhibition programs to educate the German people on
international art movements. The approach to cultural reeducation was vastly different in
the Soviet zone, and the divide became even more pronounced in 1949 with Germany’s
split into the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the democratic Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG). East German artists now worked under the style and content
dictates of Socialist Realism (which ironically shared quite a few stylistic features with
National Socialist art), reinforced by official exhibitions of the same. In contrast, West
Germany, influenced by the U.S.A, France, and Britain promoted the historical avant-garde
denigrated by the Nazis, ignoring figurative art in general lest it be associated with
didacticism. The emphasis on modernist art from other Allied nations also addressed fifteen
years of Nazi censorship and parochialism. Modernism was seen to value individual
feelings, tastes, and opinions, and hence, respect for the feelings, tastes, and opinions of
others.108
By focusing on the international avant-garde, the West German art establishment
aimed to set the historical record straight on the importance of modernism, and why and
how the Nazis abused it for propaganda purposes. The Haus der Deutschen Kunst, which
had been officially converted back into a museum, kept the 1946 moniker the Haus der
Kunst and began showing avant-garde and contemporary works. One of the first milestones
of German atonement for the Nazi vilification of the avant-garde was the September 1949
exhibition Der Blaue Reiter (The Blue Rider). Artists featured in the show included
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Wassily Kandinsky, Franz Marc, and Paul Klee, all of whom had been included in the Nazi
Entartete Kunst (Degenerate Art) exhibition of 1937.109 During the exhibition’s opening
Secretary of State Dieter Sattler remarked that the museum’s act of displaying “degenerate”
artists inside the former HDK was a way to cleanse the space of its Nazi past. 110
West Germany’s steps towards atonement–and catching up with the history of
modernism–were accompanied by the suppression of state sanctioned art produced during
the Third Reich. In 1950, the United States returned 1,659 National Socialist artworks to
the FRG.111 These particular works, assembled by Gilkey under the German Wartime Art
Program of the Historical Properties Division, were deemed by the Americans to be
politically and militaristically neutral, posing no threat to the resurgence of German
militarism or National Socialism. They likely depicted pastoral landscapes or battle scenes
without prominent Nazi imagery. 112 The art historian Bess Hormats, acting curator of the
United States Army’s art collection in 1950, wrote that the West German government
“didn’t want to have anything to do with the Nazi programs of World War II.” 113 Thus,
once the United States repatriated the works in the 1950s, they were directed into oblivion,
left to molder in a Bonn warehouse until the 1970s.114
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Chapter Two: The Generational Shift (1960-1979)

In the decade and a half following the Allied program for the denazification of culture,
German officials continued to censor art and ephemera produced by the regime.
Consequently, few people dared study or discuss Nazi approved art from the period 1933
to 1945.115 Art historians avoided the subject in much the same way that Germans of all
professions distanced themselves from any association with the Third Reich. This attitude
was understandable on the institutional level, given that many former Nazi museum
directors, academics, and art dealers resumed their former positions and activities in the
1950s, after passing the Allied denazification process.116 A number of artists, in addition
to the infamous cases of Arno Breker and Leni Riefenstahl, were banned by the Allies from
exhibiting their work publicly in Germany (this status changed in the 1980s, as will be
discussed further in the next chapter). 117 It was not until former Nazi museum directors and
academics began retiring and a new wave of young Germans came of age in the late 1960s
that there was a shift in the attitude towards the study of this taboo material. This chapter
will address the circumstances that led to a generational shift in the 1960s and which
resulted in a milestone event, in 1974: the first major West German museum exhibition to
survey the art of the Third Reich.
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Confronting the Past
The FRG first began accounting for its Nazi past in the 1960s, after a decade of historical
amnesia, when a younger generation came to understand the culpability of their parents’
and grandparents’ generations. It was accelerated by the 1961 Eichmann trial and then by
the 1968 student movements. 118 By the 1970s the notion of the Nazi perpetrator and
individual culpability entered into discussions of the history of the Third Reich.
Addressing Nazism and the complicity of German citizens became, and remained, difficult
in the postwar period, with denial compounded by the painful division of East and West,
and the fact that many former Nazis were integrated into West German society with a
number holding public office. The process of developing–and engraining–collective
memory continued over decades: for example, the term “Holocaust” entered into West
German vocabulary only in 1979 after the televised viewing of the eponymous American
series.119
West Germany’s reckoning with the past contrasted with the aggressive refusal for
any accountability on the part of the Soviet satellite German Democratic Republic (GDR).
The GDR, under the conceit of its communist ideology, presented itself as a liberating force
against the evil of fascism. From the 1950s and beyond, the division of East and West
Germany grew more pronounced, resulting in a deep cultural divide. After the initial
building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, little remained physically or ideologically
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to connect them. Initially, the GDR experienced new economic, educational, and social
opportunities after the implementation of the “New Economic System” in 1963. 120 In the
realm of culture, the government exerted strict ideological control, a policy stemming from
the offices of Walter Ulbrich, Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party beginning in the 1950s:
The GDR demanded that all historical research, writing, and teaching represent the
interests of the Communist Party and the working class. 121 According to Communist
doctrine, Nazi-Fascism was an extension of capitalism. Thus, responsibility for the crimes
of the Third Reich lay squarely upon the Federal Republic of Germany. 122 The East
Germans rewrote the history of their older Germans citizens, claiming that, as Communists,
they had led the resistance against the regime. Historians in the GDR did not confront their
Nazi past because they did not consider it to be part of their heritage. As the historian
Jeffrey Herf explains:
The meaning of coming to terms with the Nazi past was simple and
straightforward: smash capitalism. The Communists had always claimed
that capitalism contained the roots of Nazism. Because these roots had been
ripped up in the Soviet zone of occupation but were being replanted in the
Western zones, the possibility of a renewed fascism now lay outside, and
only outside East German borders, in West Germany. Antifascism was now
directed against the West German present. It no longer refers exclusively or
even primarily to the Nazi past. 123

Whereas the suppressed GDR had no internal permission, means, or impetus to examine
collective or individual culpability, the conservative government of the FRG was
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frequently criticized by its more liberal citizens for its unwillingness to confront the Nazi
past. It became paramount to contextualize the Nazi era and relate it to the current political
moment. 124 While the position of GDR would also have been a target of these liberal
critics, they were first and foremost concerned with fomenting change within their own
government, in which a number of former Nazis held posts.125
A critical turning point for the FRG was the aforementioned, highly-publicized
1961 trial of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. The jury found Eichmann
guilty of numerous charges, including organizing the deportation of Jews and Roma from
Germany, Poland, and the surrounding territories. The testimonies, evidence, and
proceedings sparked international interest in–and outrage over–the atrocities of the regime.
Voices from within Germany and across the world began to decry the role of the perpetrator
in Germany’s Nazi past, essentially shattering the amnesia that had taken over much of
West German society.
The growth in public awareness and debate regarding the role of everyday Germans
and Nazi officials in crimes against humanity and the Third Reich’s demise intensified in
1966 when Albert Speer, Hitler’s chief architect and Director of Armaments, was released
from Spandau prison. Speer appeared in numerous television interviews and published two
books: the 1969 Erinnerungen (Memories, or Inside the Third Reich) and the 1975 volume
Spandauer Tagebücher (Spandau: The Secret Diaries). The attention paid to Hitler‘s
favorite architect laid bare a new phenomenon that swept the nation in the late 1960s and
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1970s: the fascination with high-profile Nazi figures and a growing sense of nostalgia for
the Third Reich among certain quarters of the population.
The increased nostalgia seen across citizens of all ages became known as the
Hitlerwelle (Hitler-wave), a term coined in the 1970s.126 The Hitlerwelle brought about an
increase of publications, films, and documentaries that reproduced images created in
Germany from 1933 to 1945.127 Auctions selling Hitler memorabilia, as well as the highly
publicized republication of the Nazi journal Signal in 1978, contributed to public access to
Nazi imagery and growing desire to understand the recent past.128 In turn, art historians
and scholars became concerned that, without contextualization, the public would fail to
discern the still powerful draw of National Socialist imagery. Thus, during the peak of the
Hitlerwelle, in the early 1970s a number of art historians began to excavate the art and
cultural policies of Hitler’s Germany. In part, these art historians were invigorated by the
student movements of 1968 that did much to protest against the unacceptable continuity
between the Nazi past and the older generation still in positions of power.129
Until the early 1970s, West German museum exhibitions dealt with the Nazi past
by memorializing the repressive cultural polices of the Third Reich, specifically the
“degenerate” art campaign against modernism and the avant-garde art and artists
victimized by the regime. This approach made clear just how much German cultural
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patrimony had been lost by the Nazi purging of museums and destruction and sale of
artworks. The first effort in this regard was the 1962 exhibition Entartete Kunst:
Bildersturm vor 25 Jahren (Degenerate Art: Iconoclasm 25 Years Ago), with a catalogue
written by Jürgen Claus (b. 1935). 130 Notable was the use of the term–and hence, the
judgement against–iconoclasm. The show occurred in the wake of the 1961 Eichmann trial,
adding to a sense of justice being served. 131 Staged to coincide with the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the 1937 Entartete Kunst exhibition, it was the first museum exhibition
anywhere to address that nefarious show, and served to educate the public about the Nazi
confiscation of artworks, the persecution of artists, and the loss to Germany of an enormous
cultural patrimony–since many of the works had to be recuperated from foreign collections.
The original “Degenerate Art” exhibition took place in the old Institute of Archeology in
the Hofgarten, while the Nazi’s concurrently ran the first Große Deutsche Kunstausstellung
across the park in the newly built HDK. The 1962 commemorative exhibition was held in
the latter, in a powerful reversal and rectification. It was also a highly symbolic means to
rehabilitate Troost’s building–to fill it with art that the regime attempted to eliminate. The
use of the space as the center for the Allied recuperation of lost and looted works had
already begun the process of “denazification,” but the staging of Degenerate Art:
Iconoclasm 25 Years Ago demonstrated that contemporary Germany was itself addressing
the cultural legacy of the Third Reich.
It took another decade, however, for art shown at the yearly Große Deutsche
Kunstausstellungen to be brought before the public. Within the museum and academy, new
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attitudes and approaches towards Nazi fine art resulted partly from changes in an outdated
and conservative system, namely the university and historical professions. 132 As former
Nazis retired, a new generation of curators and critics born in the 1930s and 1940s took
their place, more interested in the sins of their parents than in denying deeds for which they
were not directly responsible. Addressing the persecuted artists and artworks allowed for a
pragmatic documentation of the cultural policies of the Third Reich, while encouraging a
new transparency toward the visual propaganda it generated. Thus, Nazi art and artefacts
came to be studied as historical facts, if not bona fide art.

Kunst im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung
It was not until the 1974 exhibition Kunst im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung
(Art in the Third Reich: Documents of Subjugation) that the painting and sculpture
produced during the Nazi period was displayed in a museum. The event sparked
widespread reaction and discussion on the fate and value of National Socialist visual
culture. This exhibition opened at the Frankfurt Kunstverein on October 15, 1974. A joint
project, it was co-organized by the Frankfurt Kunstverein and the Institute for Art History
at the University of Frankfurt. 133 The exhibition curators and catalogue contributors
included students from the University of Frankfurt, as well as Georg Bussmann (b. 1933),
director of the Frankfurt Kunstverein; Berthold Hinz (b. 1941), assistant professor at the
Institute for Art History, University of Frankfurt; and the academic and political scientist
Iring Festscher (1922-2014). 134 Hundreds of documents, ranging from paintings and
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photographs to maquettes and newspaper clippings, were exhibited alongside 40 paintings
and a handful of small-scale sculptures, primarily busts.135 The curatorial staff procured a
number of artworks that had not left government vaults since the 1940s, including works
returned to the FRG from the United States in the 1950s. 136 The examples included Ivo
Saliger’s The Judgment of Paris (figure 5) and Julius Paul Junghans’s Ploughing (figure
6) both formerly owned by Hitler—bringing to the fore the fact that the West German state
was in possession of Nazi art. 137
As the subtitle of the exhibition “Documents of Subjugation” attests, the contents
were weighted between fine art and archival items (the latter comprised the bulk of the
installation) to impart the overall didactic intent: to show that National Socialism used the
arts as a tool of totalitarianism, to control and inculcate the German population. In his lead
text for the catalog George Bussmann explained:
The exhibition is a narrative: in accompanying texts and photos, with the
help of additional information and interpretation, as well as quotations from
the social-political reality, the task and function of art under National
Socialism is made clear: to make ideology "real" and effective. The
exhibition can therefore not be viewed as a pure art exhibition, but rather as
a documentation that shows the extent to which art served politics. The time
of the exhibition coincides with a conspicuous and by no means harmless
wave of reminiscences of the "Third Reich." The field of fine arts is
particularly in danger of being misunderstood – because it is supposedly to
a lesser extent politically discredited. However, this cannot be countered by
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further tabooing the art of National Socialism and leaving it out of art
history as "unartistic".138

Among the key points, Bussmann framed the show as a didactic enterprise, not a show of
“pure art” but art as nefarious, if effective, propaganda. To be sure, in the postwar decades
when most forms of naturalist-realism were considered suspect or retrograde and when
abstract art served as the Cold War lingua franca of the “free” world, official Nazi art could
only be judged as mendacious and lacking any aesthetic value. 139 As the first exhibition to
address this volatile imagery, and only at two decades removed from the fall of the Reich,
the organizers had to preclude any accusations of encouraging neo-Nazi sentiments. The
agenda was openly anti-Fascist, as made clear by Bussmann’s emphasis that its timing
coincided “with a conspicuous and by no means harmless wave of reminiscences of the
‘Third Reich’.”
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Given the aim of elucidating how Nazi art functioned as propaganda, the organizers
carefully selected and installed the items on display . 140 Bussmann outlined this fact in the
opening of the catalogue where he wrote: “In the first comprehensive exhibition since
1945, which deals with the art production of the Third Reich, the selection and preparation
of materials from this not yet ‘overcome’ epoch must be taken with particular
responsibility.”141 They feared triggering what Berthold Hinz called “carefree amusement
or enthusiasm.”142 Nevertheless, neither Bussmann nor Hinz felt that the show risked being
perceived as promoting National Socialist ideologies, even if it inevitably opened old
wounds, caused anguish and shame, or prompted nostalgia–for some.143 While there would
always be a danger in the power of Nazi images, they nonetheless felt the ethical need to
address why this was the case.
An article in Der Spiegel (composed of interviews and the author’s own summaries)
published that August, only a few months before the opening, entitled “NS-Kunst—Ende
der berührungsangst” (Nazi Art—The End of the Fear of Contact), gave a platform for the
show’s aims:
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Bussmann believes it is urgent [for] his exhibition to didactically drive out
the “art-only viewpoint” from his visitors, and Hinz asserts right away that
he is not pursuing “the goal of opening up a new province for art history,
which it has excluded to this day.” Rather, both aim to present art in [the
context of its] political and social conditions and functions, an approach that
as has recently gained considerable momentum… 144
Significantly, Der Spiegel, the most widely read magazine in the FRG, was chosen for
advance publicity–and preparedness. The article noted that other scholarly disciplines were
analyzing the Nazi period. Art history was behind in its study of the subjects, style, and
iconography of the regime’s art, yet the issue of artistic quality was not to be broached: as
Hinz affirmed, the only lines of inquiry were to determine the political and social
conditions whence it derived. 145

Curatorial Presentation
The exhibition was organized around three sections (inclusive of four different mediums):
Architektur und Plastik im deutschen Faschismus (Architecture and Sculpture in German
Fascism), Malerei des deutschen Faschismus (Painting of German Fascism), and Plakate
des deutschen Faschismus (Posters of German Fascism). These sections were divided into
additional ten subthemes, with headings that, for the most part, directed audiences toward

Der Spiegel, “Kunst - Ende Der Berührungsangst.” This is the author’s translation of
the introduction. The original German is as follows: “Bussmann hält es für vordringlich,
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neue, von ihr bis heute ausgegrenzte Provinz zu erschließen". Beider Ziel ist vielmehr,
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the Nazis’ propaganda and ideological goals, content that was reiterated in the respective
catalogue texts.146
Architektur und Plastik im deutschen Faschismus comprised the following
categories: “Großbauten des Staates und der Partei: München, Nürnberg, Berlin”
(Monumental Buildings of the State and the Party: Munich, Nuremberg, and Berlin);
“Autobahnen” (Autobahn); “Das Bauprogramm der Deutschen Arbeitsfront–die Umwelt
der Arbeiter” (The Building Program of the German Labor Front–the workers'
environment); “Das Denkmal und sein Prinzip” (The Monument and its Principle); and
“Plastik” (Sculpture). The second main section, Malerei des deutschen Faschismus was
divided into four subsections that dealt with subject matter: “Programmatische Malerei”
(Programmatic Painting), “Die Darstellung des Bauern” (The Representation of the
Farmer), “Darstellung der Arbeit Malerei und Plastik” (The Representation of Labor in
Painting and Sculpture), “Die Darstellung der Frau” (Representation of Women) and “Die
Darstellung des Krieges” (The Representation of War). Significantly, the third body of
work–posters–was presented as a single whole.
The committee wanted to end the “taboo” against Nazi imagery and attempted to
do so by treating the artworks as instruments of heinous ideology and bad faith. They
integrated certain paintings and sculpture executed for the annual Great German Art shows
into thematic installations filled with illustrative tables, comments, texts, statistics, and
photographs that demonstrated the wrongdoings of National Socialism. The titles of the
exhibition should well have been reversed, for “Art in the Third Reich” was
deterministically subsumed into “Documents of Subjugation.” Yet the lead term “art”
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undoubtedly served to pique the public interest and reflected the reality that, in the context
of an exhibition, not a library, pictures are more interesting to look at and involve a different
teaching experience than viewing a succession of documents.
Upon entering the exhibition, visitors were confronted with a 1939 quote by the
Frankfurt School theorist and former German refugee Max Horkheimer: “Who speaks of
Fascism, may not be silent about Capitalism,” displayed in large font along the entrance
hall.147 The words of Horkeimer, who had returned to teach at the University of Frankfurt
(and who had died the year before the show opened) could perhaps have caused confusion
to visitors familiar with the GDR’s doctrine that Fascism was the child of capitalism.
(Fascism, not Nazism was the word of choice, to conjoin the German phenomenon to a
larger, international one.) It could easily have made more conservative visitors uneasy;
others would have understood the quote as framing the exhibition’s methodology according
to the critical theory–anti-capitalism and liberal-Marxism–of the Frankfurt’s School’s
Institute for Social Research. Horkeimer’s philosophy explored the political, economic,
and societal conditions that led to the rise of totalitarianism in all forms. The exhibition
organizers similarly aimed to document how Nazism utilized art to bind the public to
National Socialist political, economic, and societal beliefs; the quote linking Fascism and
Capitalism also served to protect them from charges of neo-Nazi sentiments from the Left.
Indeed, the subsections on the Third Reich and architecture shared a unified theme
about the exploited worker and the labor involved in the regime’s monumental building
projects, including the successful autobahn. 148 Photographs of major edifices, including the
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HDK and other Nazi party buildings on the Munich’s Königsplatz, were hung throughout
the space and paired with newspaper articles and charts detailing their construction and
size.

149

nAdditionally, the curators included maquettes of structures, such as the

Mikronwerk in Aschaffenburg and Runder Platz in Berlin (figure 7), in order to emphasize
the outsized scale of these commissions and promote a holistic look at totalitarian urban
planning inside the Third Reich. 150 By connecting celebratory structures such as the
Nuremberg Zeppelin Field, to the vast infrastructure project of the autobahn to lesser–
known projects, such as factory and community centers in Aschaffenburg, the organizers
illustrated the Nazi’s coercive control on micro and macro levels, linking the local to the
national. The exhibition linked sculpture to the building program by showing that Nazi
structures resulted in commissions for large scale freestanding works as well as bas reliefs.
In the portion titled Malerei des deutschen Faschismus, wall labels directed
viewers’ interpretation of the subject matter towards texts written by the organizers
discussing laws and daily life inside the Third Reich. These texts hung next to the paintings
and photographs of artworks in the galleries. In the section on programmatic painting,
photographic reproductions of a fresco cycle depicting workers from the BerlinSchönebergby city hall (figure 8), painted by the Nazi artist Franz Eichhorst (1895-1948),
were placed alongside texts promoting the notion of Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s
community, a racially charged ideology promoted by the Nazis to unify the German people
through the Aryan race. 151 In the catalogue the function of the imagery promoting the
people’s community was described as: “The art of German fascism had to fulfill an
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important task in conveying and spreading this mystification. It tried to persuade the people
to [the] superstition that they [Aryan Germans] had finally come to what was rightfully
theirs’.”152
A key artwork in the “Representation of the Farmer” section was Julius Paul
Junghanns’s idyllic canvas Ploughing. Purchased by Adolf Hitler at the 1940 GDK, this
image depicts a romanticized scene of a farmer, plough, and three horses, set against a
sunlit terrain. 153 In 1940, Junghanns’s painting had been lauded by the Nazi art critic
Robert Scholz (1902-1981) as “great and simple in its understanding of man and animal in
their common working and resting.”154 While Junghanns never joined the Nazi party, his
paintings were included in the yearly Große Deutsche Kunstausstellungen from 1937 to
1944 and were very popular among the Nazi elite. 155 In the exhibition the image served to
reinforce the curators’ social history narrative. Junghanns’s painting functioned to not only
glorify farmers, but to promote a racially charged doctrine known as blut und boden (blood
and soil). This theme carried over into the section on women that explored Nazism’s
idealization of peasant women (figure 9) who worked the land and mothers who bore strong
white, and physically fit children. Several messages were clear: the drive for a “pure”
blooded Aryan nation; to populate the country, to wage more wars, and defend the

Ibid., 130. This is the author’s translation, the original German is as follows: “Eine
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Fatherland; and avoidance of the suggestion that women work in the office or in industries
(by contrast, although the formal and often times the ideological content is closely
paralleled within Soviet and Nazi art, Soviet Socialist Realism placed women on near equal
footing with men working in factories).
Other depictions of women included nude mythological scenes, such as Ivo
Saliger’s The Judgment of Paris or Adolf Ziegler’s famed triptych Die Vier Elemente (Four
Elements) (figure 10). The organizers’ remarked on the importance of the nude in the
tradition of history painting, particularly the 19th century, and that the mythological nudes
prevalent throughout NS art continued this tradition. 156 Two student curators, Christian
Groß and Uwe Großman, wrote in the catalogue that the subject of mythology was used in
paintings of women because it removed the nude figures from reality, historical reference,
or contemporary likeness. 157 Furthermore, they noted that although nudes made in the 19th
century, for which these paintings were modeled after, were well crafted and exuded a
sense of melancholy, the images of “National Socialism were unreflective, overconfident
and showy.”158
The last section on Nazi propaganda posters discussed how the media and mass
cultural items reinforced the ideologies represented in architecture, sculpture, and painting.
Although advertisements and propaganda imagery depicting work, from farmers to
construction workers, and soldiers, would have hung throughout towns, magazines, and
newspapers, the organizers did not construct a strong narrative of how the imagery would
have been seen by the public. Moreover, they did not spend much time discussing the
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content of the images. Rather, the section on posters centered on simply the fact that mass
media conveyed Nazi ideas, including tropes such as Volksgemeinschaft, anti-Bolshevism,
and anti-Judaism.
In the short catalogue essay for this section, the student author Richard Grübling
wrote that mass media, from films, photographs, caricatures, and poster were similar to the
fine arts, because both were part of the Nazi propaganda machine. 159 Essentially, Grübling
argues that the only difference between explicit propaganda, as exhibited in posters, and
fine arts, such as paintings or sculptures, was the medium and public access. Nevertheless,
the exhibition made a key point regarding the National Socialist treatment of representation
in fine art versus mass culture: the latter served as a vehicle of caricature and vilification
of the racial, ethnic, sexual, and political “other.” Official painting and sculpture, instead,
focused on the body beautiful, the family, and national values of the German people.
Posters imagined the look and threat of the enemies of the people, including the Bolsheviks,
Judaism, and political dissidents. One example, in the exhibition, is the 1941 poster Hinter
den Feindmachten: der Jude (Behind the Enemy: The Jew) (figure 11), which depicts a
Jewish businessman behind the flags of Germany’s enemies: The United Kingdom, Soviet
Union, and United States. The poster caricatures the Jewish man by giving him a large nose
(a visual signifier seen throughout anti-Jewish propaganda imagery), and the flags serve to
promote the idea of a conspiracy against Germany between the Jews and the countries
represented.
Although the exhibition established that all art created for the Third Reich was
propaganda, the final section demonstrated that the regime made a distinction between fine
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art and items of visual culture which were created specifically to indoctrinate viewers.
Nevertheless, concepts such as artistic agency, or the actual political beliefs and adherence
of individual artists, was a methodology not yet broached in 1974. In sum, in framing the
final section of the exhibition the organizers sought to demonstrate that official painting of
the period was nonetheless questionable as art and creativity, precisely because it was so
highly successful as state formulated propaganda.

Critical Reactions
After the exhibition closed in Frankfurt, it traveled throughout the Federal Republic. The
exhibition first went to the Hamburg Kunstverein from December 21, 1974–February 2,
1975. It later made stops at the Württembergischer Kunstervein in Stuttgart (February 20–
March 30, 1975), Stadtische Kunstsammlungen in Ludwigshafen (April 12–May 25,
1975), Kunst und Museumsverein Wuppertal in Wuppertal-Elberfeld (June 8–July 13,
1975), and the Haus am Waldsee in Berlin—where it officially ended on October 19,
1975.160
In the first eight weeks alone 36,000 people visited the Frankfurt Kunstverein. 161
In conjunction with the exhibition, public forums were organized to promote a dialogue
about the images presented, and during its run the exhibition gained considerable media
attention. 162 Critical reactions came from all parts of the political spectrum, and issues

160

Ibid., 1.
Heskett, “Art and Design in Nazi Germany.” 141.
162 George Bussmann, “Press release of the Initiative against the Diffusion of NS Art,
October 1974” in Betrifft: Reaktionen. Anlass: Kunst im 3. Reich – Docukmente der
Unterfung. Ort. Frankfurt 1975, 169. This citation was taken from John Heskett. “Art and
Design in Nazi Germany.” According to Heskett this book combines a number of press
161

58

arose with all aspects of the show from the layout to content. The display of previously
censored Nazi art and documents created controversy throughout Germany as to the
validity of these materials as art and/or as propaganda. While the exhibition organizers
were not aiming to rehabilitate Nazi art or argue its artistic merit, there were a number of
people in the public who felt that it was not bad art and worthy of some merit. 163
Though Hinz did not explicitly state it, one of his reasons for the advance piece in
Der Spiegel may well have been to counter potential backlash from the Vereinigung der
Verfolgten des Nazi-Regimes (The Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime). Indeed,
the group staged numerous protests in an attempt to stop the show. 164 The association
reasoned that there was no need for an exhibition on Nazi art and that these images offended
those who had suffered under National Socialism. 165 When the association’s demands that
the exhibition be halted were not met, they requested that visitors be required to give their
reasons for going and to be accompanied by a trained guide.166 These requests were denied
because the organizing committee disagreed with their complaints, believing that these
suggestions went against their duty to strip away the taboos surrounding the art of the Third
Reich.167
In his review of the show, four years after it opened in Frankfurt, British historian
John Heskett assessed the overall critical reactions:
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It is a weakness of most art exhibitions that little attempt is made to place
the works in their social context. That the organizers of ‘Art in the Third
Reich’ did so was an important step forward and necessary under the
circumstance. But doubts were raised by the precise method used and
therefore its wider validity, particularly the technique of simply juxtaposing
art objects with information on the social context, and interpreting them
solely in terms of that information. This may be useful in identifying
ideological content, but there is danger that a work may have an ideological
interpretation imposed upon it…One of the problems that I found visiting
the exhibition was the difficulty of relating much of the imagery to the
comment accompanying them.168

Heskett added that visitors to the exhibition were “undoubtedly influenced by their
awareness of its didactic nature and much of the reaction was conditioned by political
opposition to, or support of, the basic concept presented.” 169 In other words, the show did
little to successfully educate the public.
Heskett took particular issue with the juxtaposition of photographs and texts with
actual paintings, as well as the exclusive emphasis on socio-political histories versus
artistic merit and style. He found it difficult to relate the imagery to the accompanying
materials and commentary, because the layout obscured the ideas presented throughout the
exhibition.170 One example he recounted was the placement of a 1936 photograph of a
Bavarian landscape with farmers pulling a plow positioned next to Junghanns’s Ploughing.
He wrote:
The painting [Ploughing] was an obvious piece of idealization that bore
little relationship to the practical realities of everyday rural life, but the
photograph also aroused skepticism as to the extent that it represented the
general reality of agricultural work in the Third Reich…This technique of
juxtaposition was, it seemed to me, an imprecise tool that could all too easily
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be challenged and thus cast doubt on the validity of more fundamental and
serious purposes of the exhibition. 171

Essentially, Heskett took issue with the fact that neither the painting, nor the photograph
portrayed an accurate representation of farm life–perhaps this issue had to do with the lack
of discussion on how photography served as a curated form of Nazi propaganda.
Other critics also took issue with the emphasis on socio-political content over
discussion of style or technique, and even the comparative methodologies. They noted that
the show did not contextualize these works in the larger context of history painting or
address how that genre was revived by totalitarian regimes in general. For example, the
Rheinische Merkur newspaper explicitly noted the similarities in style between the
naturalist-realism of Nazi history painting and Soviet Socialist Realism:
The left-tainted intellectuals must in any case be very naïve, otherwise they
would have noticed in time the boomerang of this exhibition. Everywhere
one heard young men telling their wives that the art of the Soviet Union was
exactly the same. Also on the sheets of [paper] on which visitors could set
their opinion, one found nothing more frequent than references to the art of
the Communist dictatorships. 172

Beginning with Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and during the
1960s and 1970s scholarly texts compared the common political strategies of Nazism,
Fascism, and Stalinist Communism. 173 Thus, critics believed that the organizers had failed
to address the obvious connection between the art created by each of these regimes.
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Nevertheless, this content had been considered by the organizing committee and failed to
take off. The curators feared that if they had included a comparison of Nazism and
Stalinism within the exhibition it would interfere with their overall message. The exhibition
intended to show how National Socialist art functioned as propaganda. 174 It did not serve
as a space to discuss the similarities between official Nazi art and that of other totalitarian
regimes.
Despite the criticism surrounding the exhibition, it marked an end to the complete
ostracization of National Socialist art. Many West Germans, particularly art historians,
could or would not separate the art from propaganda, but some, such as the exhibition
organizers were willing to confront them as documents pertaining to German history.
Looking back on the project in a 1988 interview, George Bussmann spoke of the substantial
risk they took in staging the exhibition. 175 Not everyone saw it as decidedly antifascist,
although this position was clear from the inception and central to its choice of objects,
didactics, and layout. 176 He added that a measure of its complexity was found in the
conflicting attitudes he encountered with the organizing committee, especially given the
urgency seen in the threat of the Hitlerwelle. He recalled a certain planning meeting, where
the stakes were clear:
A colleague at a meeting of the exhibition organizers had said that Nazi art
was by no means just bad, but that some of pictures and sculpture were quite
noteworthy…This was not just nostalgia, but a revaluation of this art
without political sign. That was unbearable and unthinkable for me. 177
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Chapter Three: The Return of the Repressed

After the polemics generated by Kunst im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung,
many visitors to the exhibition believed that the art of the Third Reich was sheer
propaganda, and not art (although there were people who felt otherwise). During the 1980s,
the distrust and dislike of Nazi imagery continued. But the collective need to lift the veil
of historical amnesia prompted more studies on–and new attitudes toward–the art produced
under National Socialism. Independently, yet significantly, in this regard, the United States
government decided, in the mid-1980s, to return approximately 6,100 artworks to the West
German government. The discussions that took place among American officials to reach
that decision, the subject of this chapter, indicated not only the changing attitude toward
Nazi imagery some four decades after the fall of Hitler, but also of a perceived, newfound
responsibility on the part of German institutions to manage their patrimony.
These developments in the cultural realm occurred in tandem with more complex
historiographical analyses of the Nazi period on the part of both German and American
scholars. Revisionist assessments of collective German guilt and the exceptionalism of
Nazi atrocities prompted new controversies, in particular the West German Historikerstreit
(historians’ debate) of the late 1980s, which shook the academic establishment. 1983
marked fifty years since Hitler’s rise to power. With the passage of time came distance
from the regime and those directly responsible for the crimes it perpetuated. The lapses in
memory, ebbing of guilt and need for atonement were epitomized by the so-called Bitburg
controversy of 1985. That year, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a speech that, in
effect, distanced himself and all West Germans from the atrocities committed by the Nazis.
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The context was an event organized by the governments of the FRG and the United States
to strengthen both their alliance and that of NATO.
During a 1984 visit to the United States, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
asked President Ronald Reagan to join him on a visit to a German military cemetery, home
to fallen American and German soldiers, for a symbolic wreath laying ceremony in the
spring.178 Controversy ensued when the media revealed the Bitburg cemetery chosen for
the ceremony did not have any American graves; instead, forty-nine SS soldiers were
buried there. 179 Exacerbating the diplomatic missteps was the embarrassing fact the
President’s visit with Chancellor Kohl did not include a scheduled stop at a concentration
camp to honor victims of the Holocaust. 180
In a March 21, 1985 press conference, regarding his forthcoming trip, Reagan stated
that he would not visit a concentration camp, because “instead of reawakening
memories…we should observe this as the day when, forty years ago, peace began.” 181 He
then commented upon and defended contemporary West Germans, “… none of them who
were adults and participating in any way [in World War II were still alive]… very few…
even remember the war… a guilt feeling [has] been imposed upon them, and I just think
it’s unnecessary.” 182 His words served to absolve contemporary Germany of the atrocities
of the Holocaust due to the generational gap. American Jews spoke out against the
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President’s remarks and planned visit to Bitburg, notably Hyman Bookbinder, Washington
representative of the American Jewish Committee, Elie Wiesel, chairman of the United
States Holocaust Memorial Council, and Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the
Union of American Hebrew Congregations.183 In an effort to save face, Reagan agreed to
add on a visit to a concentration camp. Nevertheless, he once again ignited scandal,
outrage, and pain when he described the SS men buried at Bitburg as, “victims of Nazism
also…They were victims, just as surely as victims in the concentration camps…young
soldiers were conscripted, forced into military service in the closing days of the Third
Reich.”184
When the day came for Reagan and Kohl’s visit to Bitburg, the schedule allotted
ten minutes for the wreath laying ceremony. No words were spoken at the cemetery. 185 The
West German government did little to reverse course or quell the negative perceptions. In
the months leading up to the Bitburg visit, Chancellor Kohl remarked in a speech that his
birth year meant he was too young to have participated in the abhorrent actions carried out
by the Third Reich, exonerating him from any accountability, echoing Reagan’s opinion. 186
The two statemen’s public announcements in the months preceding the Bitburg visit
indicated the growing movement away from the need for atonement.
A year after the Bitburg controversy, West German historian Ernst Nolte published
an editorial “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will: Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber
nicht mehr gehalten werden konnte” (The Past That Will Not Go Away: A Speech That
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Could Be Written but Not Delivered) in the conservative-liberal newspaper the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, which set out to lessen the crimes of the Holocaust. It inaugurated
what came to be known as the Historikerstreit or historians’ debate over the exceptionalism
of Nazi atrocities, especially its precisely executed, genocidal campaigns.187 Nolte claimed
that the Holocaust was not unique, given the murderous Soviet reign of terror (what he
referred to as the “Asiatic model”) and Francoist “white terror” (a genocide committed by
the Nationalist faction during the Spanish Civil War and initial ten years of Francisco
Franco’s rule). 188 The reaction was swift, most notably from Jürgen Habermas who
countered, with his article Vom öffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie (On the Public Use of
History) published in Die Zeit, that the issue was an attempt to “relativize” the crimes of
the Holocaust through faulty moral equivalencies (such as Kohl’s and Reagan’s equation
of the SS fallen to victims of the concentration camps) and failed to acknowledge the
uniqueness of the Nazi Final Solution. 189
The Historikerstreit prompted a larger discussion among intellectuals as to how to
write and record the rise of Nazism and the events of the Holocaust. Historians such as
Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer contributed the articles “Plädoyer für eine
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Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus” (A Plea for a Historicization of National
Socialism) in the magazine Merkur and “Some Reflections on the Historicization of
National Socialism” in Tel Aviv Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte, respectively.190 The
dispute emphasized the growing tensions in the FRG as to how ordinary West Germans
were to understand their history. Should a generation forty years removed from the fall of
National Socialism continue to take responsibility for the sins of their parents and
grandparents? Given the growing number of comparative studies on totalitarian regimes
and genocides, some participants in the Historikerstreit asked why Germany should
continue to represent the greatest, or singular, culpability for crimes against humanity. As
the need for personal and generational atonement faded by the 1990s, as lessons on the
Holocaust were embedded into German school curriculums, and as East and West became
reunited, so too did attitudes change toward Nazi imagery and the German public’s ability
to see it anew.

Revisiting the German War Art Collection
In 1982, just a few years before the Historikerstreit erupted, the United States government
voted to repatriate a majority of the remaining artworks from the German War Art
Collection. As noted in chapter one, a number of pieces had already been returned to
Germany in 1951 while the rest of the collection remained under the care of the U.S. Army
Center of Military History.191 The Army had distributed the artworks across the continental
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United States, storing many in warehouses in Richmond, Virginia, and Pueblo, Colorado;
others were displayed in United States Government buildings, including the Pentagon and
Congress.192 Although some were put on display, most remained sequestered in deplorable
conditions.193 Take, for example, the United States Army warehouse in Pueblo, Colorado,
which, since 1972, housed three hundred paintings and various other crates filled with war
paraphernalia and World War II ammunitions. Many of the canvases were severely
damaged due to the lack of any preservation efforts taken by Army personnel. Pieces were
scattered around the warehouse or loosely packed in crates; some forty unframed canvases
were leaned up against the concrete walls. 194 These paintings depicted Nazi party rallies or
National Socialist leaders, such as Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and others, in
uniform.195 Individuals who visited the warehouses in Colorado and Virginia commented
on the squalid conditions under which the paintings were kept.
While the Army evidently cared little for the majority of the works in their care,
there remained an interest in their holdings from students and World War II enthusiasts.
Over the years, the Pueblo warehouse custodian, Ralph Martinez, took steps to preserve
some of the artworks after he realized they appeared to be of historical value due to the
increasing number of student visitors and historians to the warehouse each year. 196
Martinez even erected a rope barrier in front of the paintings to keep visitors from touching
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them, and later humidified the rooms by placing large water-filled tubs on the concrete
floor to preserve the quality of the paint, which he noticed seemed to be drying out. Despite
one man’s attempt to preserve these historical artifacts, the majority of the Army’s
collection remained neglected until 1981.
On September 23 of that year, the Committee on Armed Services of the United
States House of Representatives convened to discuss Bill H.R. 3555, introduced by
Congressman G. William Whitehurst [R-Virginia]. The bill aimed to authorize the
repatriation of the German War Art Collection to the Federal Republic of Germany. 197 This
was not Whitehurst’s first time advocating for repatriation, as he previously sponsored a
bill in 1978 which sanctioned the return of ten German naval paintings by the artist Claus
Bergen to the FRG.198 The meeting did, however, mark the first time that Whitehurst, or
anyone else, had proposed a full review of the materials in Army custody.
In his arguments advocating for repatriation, Whitehurst paid particular attention to
the issue of subject matter. He maintained that most of the 6,300 artworks were not overtly
propagandistic, as they did not explicitly glorify Hitler or Nazi ideology. 199 This differed
vastly from a 1947 statement by Captain Gilkey: “If it [the trove of art] had been left in
Germany, it would have been a potential threat to the world through future reinstallation
and German misuse.”200Whitehurst acknowledged the concerns of the committee and the
public, that to “send back art of an inflammatory nature . . . would glorify a loathsome
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regime in German history and encourage a resurgence of the Nazi spirit.”

201

Yet,

Whitehurst reasoned that because the artworks from the German War Art Collection had
been displayed for some time in congressional committee and subcommittee rooms, at the
Pentagon, in Army liaison offices, and even in his own office, they posed no threat as a
whole.202
Based on the paintings he had reviewed, Whitehurst concluded that they were not
categorically “Nazi art,” but “war art,” showing the life of German military personnel under
the best and the worst conditions, as indeed soldiers, sailors, and airmen of all nations
experience it. Indeed, Marylou Gjernes, the art curator of the U.S. Army Center of Military
History, echoed Whitehurst’s sentiments, but judged positively the artistic merits of many
of the works:
Included in the collection are oils, watercolors, pastels, drawings, woodcuts,
lithos, etchings, and wood and metal sculpture. Four watercolors executed
between 1904 and 1919 and attributed to Adolf Hitler are included. Some
of the paintings and drawings are brilliant in conception and execution.
They show by their artistry, color, and mood, the spirit of combat, and
desolation, destruction, and tragedy of war. There are illustrations of the
despair and boredom of the troops, general war scenes, portraits of soldiers
as well as the military and political leaders, and numerous renderings of
various scenes with no apparent political or military connotation
whatever.203

Adamant that the majority of works were not overtly political or propagandistic in nature,
Gjernes and Whitehurst still proposed that all works in the collection be reviewed
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according to strict criteria before their return. 204 Those items to remain in the United States
included:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Paintings which depict Nazi party emblems
Paintings of leaders of the Nazi party hierarchy
Paintings of convicted war criminals
Paintings whose overall impression is to glorify Nazism
Paintings attributed to Adolf Hitler
Subjects deemed useful as historical or educational media for the U.S.
Army and Air Force205

Of the approximately 7,000 artworks in the army collection, 6,100 were deemed to not be
explicitly emblematic of National Socialism and were repatriated to the FRG. 206 Bill H.R.
3555 demonstrated how the United States government (in the 1980s) rationalized the
preservation of National Socialist art. Once considered to be the embodiment of
totalitarianism, and genocide and a vehicle of hatred, these works were now given historical
significance, with some examples even treated as worthy, as we have seen, in subject, style,
and technique.207 In his testimony, Whitehurst additionally urged Congress to consider the
positive diplomatic implications of repatriation, insisting that a show of good faith in West
Germany’s ability to manage the artworks would bolster the alliance with the FRG against
a potential “Soviet onslaught.”208
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After the United States congressional committee reviewed the works in the
collection, they officially transferred them to the West German government in January
1983 with the stipulation that the latter would cover all transportation costs for their
return.209 The artworks were not actually dispatched until 1986 due to issues surrounding
copyright and good title once they were back in West Germany. 210 All told, the return of
art once perceived to be threatening demonstrates that, by the 1980s, the fear of these
images’ power had largely receded, concerns over a Nazi resurgence in West Germany had
subsided, and the FRG had proved itself to be not only a solid democracy, but an important
bulwark against the Soviets.
Although the FRG never explicitly expressed interest in repatriating the artworks,
the government was grateful for their return. 211 Christoph Bruemmer, Deputy Press
Secretary of the German Embassy in Washington, DC, made it clear that, although certain
individuals saw aesthetic value in the works, the West German government viewed the
artworks “as historical documents. . .We [FRG government officials] don’t see them so
much as artistic achievements. . .[but] some people who have seen the pieces out of this
collection have told me that you could think of them as having artistic merit.” 212 To further
drive the point home, Bruemmer affirmed that West Germany “doesn’t have plans to
exhibit the paintings, only to keep them in archives and have them available to
historians.”213 Once the works made their way back to Germany, the government placed
them in the care of the Bavarian Army Museum in Ingolstadt, where they were once again
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ignored and consigned to oblivion until the government could determine what to do with
them.214 The repressed was literally returned, but it was not allowed to surface into German
public consciousness.
Although Kunst im Dritten Reich had reached a wide audience when it toured in
West Germany, it included relatively few paintings and sculptures, as noted earlier. The
inability to see the panoply of Nazi art–even as photographs of totalitarian atrocities had
appeared in films, illustrated magazines, and newspapers for decades–shaped the
complicated nexus of opinions surrounding the desire, or lack thereof, for its “unveiling.”
Indeed, in a September 1986 article in Die Zeit, Petra Kipphoff questioned opinions about
the art precisely because so few people had actually seen it firsthand, and thus could hardly
judge it objectively 215 She denounced the West German government’s decision to hide
away the repatriated German War Art Collection, stating that, although there had been talk
of scholarly evaluation, the collection remained off limits.216 Implicitly arguing against a
tout court rejection of all art created during the period, she gave the example of the artist
Rudolf Belling, whose art was simultaneously glorified and denigrated by the Nazis having
been exhibited in both the GDK and Entartete Kunst exhibitions: clearly one had to
evaluate his work on a case by case basis.217 Urging the public to consider technical merit
and subject matter through firsthand experience with the objects opened the door for the
government to address how and when to show it. That such art was realist in style did not
help the cause for its appreciation, given the hegemony of modernist art and abstraction in
the West during the Cold War: indeed the problem of realism or academic figurative art–
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perceived by art experts as retrograde and inherently doctrinaire–complicated the reception
of the aesthetics (versus the pedagogical use value) of Nazi art, as the next chapter makes
clear.
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Chapter Four: The Power of Nazi Images

Contemporaneous with the Bitberg controversy and the Historikerstreit, two influential
private collectors on opposite sides of the Atlantic publicly made known their interest in
acquiring and displaying National Socialist art, though for different reasons: the German
chocolate magnate and museum founder Peter Ludwig (along with his wife, Irene
Monheim), who lauded the talents of the committed Nazi, Arno Breker; and the American
Mitchell Wolfson Jr. who valued what he perceived as the undeniable creativity involved
in the creation of propaganda. Wolfson acquired Nazi ephemera, paintings and posters
alongside those of other regimes and governments between the wars. Both collectors
mounted defenses of their acquisitions on the basis of artistic merit, though Wolfson helped
define another field entirely–that of visual culture, in which the hierarchies between high
and low were overturned in favor of criteria that addressed both effectiveness, audience
reception, and propaganda techniques. Their collecting practices ignited new debates and
fostered more nuanced approaches toward the Nazi art, both within Germany and without.
Although the West German government viewed the painting and sculpture of the
Third Reich as purely historical artefacts and not works of fine art, Peter Ludwig (19251996) felt otherwise. An art historian, voracious collector, head of a German chocolate
empire, and philanthropist (whose name is found on numerous museums throughout
Germany and Europe thanks to hallmark gifts from the Ludwigs, which founded the basis
of the museum collections), Ludwig single-handedly attempted to rehabilitate at least some
German art produced under Nazi auspices between 1933 and 1945, by championing the
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work of Arno Breker (figure 12).218 Ludwig studied art history at the Mainz University,
where he published his dissertation on Pablo Picasso, Das Menschenbild Picassos als
Ausdruck eines generationsbedingten Lebensgefühls (Picasso's Image of Man as an
Expression of a Generational Attitude Towards Life).219 During his time at the university,
he met his wife Irene Monheim, heir to a German chocolate empire. In 1952, Ludwig was
appointed managing director of Monheim Schokolade, based at Aachen, and in 1969
became its chairman. 220 This position gave him a lucrative income, and the couple amassed
a large art collection including Pre-Columbian sculpture, Delft tiles, porcelain, medieval,
and classical art, Dada and Pop.221 It was reported that by the mid-1970s the Ludwigs were
buying an average of one artwork a day. They were also public philanthropists, loaning
artworks to museums throughout Germany and abroad; the loans later became permanent
gifts and many museums changed their names in honor of their generosity. 222
Peter Ludwig’s presumed support of National Socialist visual culture made national
news in 1986 after he commissioned Arno Breker (1900-1991) to render busts of him and
his wife with the intention of housing them in the Museum Ludwig in Cologne.223 Founded
in 1976, the institution was established when the Ludwigs donated part of their collections
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of 1960s and 1970s art, primarily American Pop Art, on the condition that the city build a
museum to house the collection. 224 The museum opened to the public in 1986.
Breker was, notoriously, Adolf Hitler’s favorite artist, and received the most
prestigious public commissions of the Third Reich. His neoclassical style is often
considered the quintessential embodiment of National Socialist aesthetics, and he focused
almost exclusively on heroic male nudes (figures 13 and 14) in poses of noble suffering or
glorious battle. He also made a number of bronze portraits of Nazi officials, including
Hitler (figure 15). The physical perfection of the sculpted bodies, especially when rendered
in white marble, embodied the Aryan ideal and the fight for the supremacy of the pure
German race. His 1939 sculptures of Der Wehrmacht (The Army) and Die Partei (The
Party) were made to adorn the entryway of the Reich Chancellery, (figure 16) designed by
Albert Speer, one of the most important buildings in Berlin and the symbolic center of Nazi
power.
Despite his successful career during the Third Reich and close relationship with
Hitler (figure 17), Breker rehabilitated his public persona in the postwar period. In his
denazification trial he was judged a fellow traveler or “follower,” rather than an “offender,”
meaning he was deemed as sympathetic and cooperative with the Third Reich, but not a
militant Nazi, profiteer or criminal. Dr. Helene Vogt, chair of the board that heard his case
in 1948, noted that Breker “had received only unimportant profits from his activities.” 225
His punishments were to pay a small fine of one hundred deutsche marks and a ban from
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exhibiting his artworks in museums.226 The verdict resulted in the impression that Breker
played a minimal role within the Nazi Party, but this was not the case; it also implied that
admired artists were somehow by nature and profession, incapable of serious misdeeds. In
fact, he was not only a member of the Nazi party, but a “political leader” or high ranking
official.227
As Jonathan Petropolous’s research has established, this position afforded him a
lavish lifestyle, including an industrial complex-turned-workshop in Wriezen, sixty miles
southeast of Berlin, staffed with sculptors, laborers of various skill levels, and French and
Italian prisoners of war. 228 Hitler provided Breker with approximately one million
Reichsmark salary, and a number of residences within Germany and Paris, including the
Aryanized Paris residence of the Jewish-American Helena Rubinstein. 229 In addition to
these amenities and his high salary, Breker had a steady stream of bronze throughout the
war; bronze was not only a rare commodity, but the practice of casting in bronze had been
prohibited by the Reich in 1940. 230 Postwar scholars have posited that the majority of
Breker’s material came from melted down French statues. 231 Having received a light
sanction, Breker subsequently enjoyed a successful postwar career, designing sculptures
and reliefs for buildings in Düsseldorf, Munich, Essen, and Siegen; he even completed a
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1979 bronze portrait bust of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (figure 18). Breker nevertheless
remained a controversial figure and many, rightly, considered his work to be directly linked
to, and evocative of, the genocidal regime.232 The decision of Ludwig, who was not only a
major collector of modernist art, but also a museum founder–to commission the two bronze
busts, rendered in a conservative, realist style similar to that of Breker’s effigies of Adolf
Hitler and other Nazi officials, generated a public outcry.
The controversy was less about style than it was about the artist’s historical record
and involvement with National Socialism. He had worked directly with and for the Führer
and created monuments to the Nazi regime and he was rewarded handsomely. Many in the
FRG could not separate Breker’s art from his personal biography. The shadow of his
history, not to mention how his neoclassical style served the ideology of the regime, could
not be ignored. Moreover, Ludwig released a statement voicing his affinity for Breker’s
entire body of work on aesthetic grounds, affirming his belief that the art created in
Germany from 1933 to 1945 should no longer be excluded from art museums. 233
Art historians, such as Ursel Berger, Director of the Georg Kolbe Museum, had
long been opposed, as a matter of principle, to the reincorporation of Nazi pictures into
public art institutions. 234 In 1983, when Breker’s work was shown in Paris at the Centre
Pompidou, she reacted by calling him “a non-artist.” 235 The general consensus among
Berger and her West German peers in the 1980s was that the art of the Nazi era should not
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be displayed in art museums or even special exhibitions because it was not art and gave it
underserved imprimatur. 236 Likewise, in reaction to the Ludwig controversy, the West
German graphic artist and lawyer Klaus Staeck joined forces with museum directors,
curators, and artists, signing a protest against putting Nazi art in museums. 237 They noted
Breker’s heinous past and called for a stop of the reevaluation of Nazi art as fine art. In
effect, the Ludwig controversy became a lightning rod for a debate among art historians
and journalists as to the fate and value of art from the Nazi era and the dictated style of
academic realism and faux romanticism associated with it.
Ludwig responded by comparing the rejection of National Socialist artworks by
curators and art historians to the Nazi censorship of modern art–a false analogy given the
specific racial grounds for that censorship and its use as a means to repress civil liberties,
free expression and incite violence. 238 He argued that critics should look beyond its Nazi
past and judge the artworks based on their technical and aesthetic qualities alone, focusing
the issue solely on the merits–or lack thereof–of Nazi art. 239 Critics felt that acknowledging
any kind of artistry was akin to absolution and would erase or trivialize Germany’s Nazi
history.240 It should come as no surprise, then, that many in the art world could not perceive
any redeeming qualities in the style or subjects of official art produced under the regime or
attempt to discern them. In their eyes, such imagery only operated as propaganda with
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heinous implications. Nonetheless, Ludwig’s comments broke a taboo, and gave
permission to others to voice their appreciation of academic figuration, bucolic native
landscapes, and genre painting of a homogenous and largely rural society. Many believed
that art should be isolated from politics and based solely on the visual experience.
Disingenuously, Arno Breker later in life told an interviewer that “his sculpture. . .
has nothing to do with politics. . .for good art is above politics.” 241 Such a commonly held
view skirted the obvious–that some “good” art (and talented artists) could also be excellent
propaganda. The number of commissions Breker received from 1945 to 1986 more than
proves that, while many West German art collectors and academics condemned Nazism,
they were comfortable with the academic realism and other conservative figurative styles
that it promoted and dismissed opinions that it could only be seen as expressive of the
beliefs of Third Reich. Such was the opinion of U.S. Congressman Whitehurst, when he
stated that the works of Nazi art he had seen exhibited great technical prowess; he
considered them to be “very, very good.”242
In the end Ludwig backtracked, saying he was misquoted and never intended to
display the Breker busts in the newly opened Cologne Museum. Instead, the work remained
in his private collection until his death. Interestingly, the Breker busts are today housed
outside of Germany on a long term-loan from the Ludwigs’ foundation, the Peter und Irene
Ludwig Stiftung, Aachen, to the Ludwig Museum in Budapest, Hungary (founded by the
Ludwigs in 1989).243 Although Peter Ludwig did not commission any additional works by
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Breker or collect other Nazi artworks (although there are some accounts that he owned one
other Breker work), his vocal support of Breker’s rehabilitation shook not only the West
German art historical community but the nation as a whole. 244 Peter and Irene Ludwig
remained a controversial couple for the remainder of their lives, yet their avid passion for
collecting art and founding museums throughout the world continued.
As for Arno Breker, his rehabilitation in the 1980s may have been epitomized by
the Ludwig controversy but it was not limited to this singular patron or to German
collectors. In fact, a number of art historians, including the American John Zavrel, voiced
their support of his work. Zavrel maintained that Breker was “the greatest living sculptor
in the classical tradition of this century.” 245 Perhaps the most striking example of support
for the artist occurred in 1985 when Marco and Joe Bodenstein, Breker’s postwar art
dealers, founded the private Arno Breker Museum in Schloss Nörvenich near Cologne.
With more and more people voicing their support for the artist the museum provided a
space where fans could gather to see Breker’s recent or surviving works. Nevertheless, by
the 1990s the museum was renamed The Museum of European Art and the collection

museums across the globe, twelve of which bear the name Ludwig and were founded
thanks to donations from Peter and Irene Ludwig. See the foundation’s website: "Peter Und
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expanded to include surrealist artists such as Salvador Dalí and Viennese Fantastic Realist
painter Ernst Fuchs.246
The growing debates over the validity of Nazi art in the 1980s, coupled with the
Ludwig controversy, reinforced the anxiety throughout the FRG that if any art tinged by
National Socialism entered into public art museum collections or temporary exhibitions
then the art could be seen as relativizing and thereby mitigating the impact of the Nazi
atrocities.247 Although instances such as the Ludwig controversy demonstrated that artists
and artworks tied to the Third Reich had supporters within the Federal Republic, there was
still no clear resolution about what to do with the stock of art from the Great German Art
Exhibitions under government care, and how to navigate the blurry and fluctuating dividing
line–and value judgements–between art and propaganda.

Propaganda “Arts”
While the Federal Republic of Germany began to question when, where, and how to
consider the aesthetic merits of Nazi art, an American collector staked his claim to
evaluating and appreciating the aesthetic power of propaganda. Be it fine arts, decorative
arts, or graphic design, the Miami-based Mitchell (Micky) Wolfson Jr. (b.1939) used the
heretofore oxymoronic term “propaganda arts” to acknowledge that images of persuasion

Ibid., 276. It could further be argued that while Breker’s rehabilitation certainly helped
validate his ego as an artist, the increased interest in his life and work during the 1980s
and 1990s lifted much of the cultural amnesia on the private lives and complicity of
artists inside the Third Reich. With renewed public interest came increased scrutiny, and
the publicity surrounding this controversial figure eventually led to a reevaluation of his
life inside Nazi Germany, allowing for later studies in the 2000s such as Jonathan
Petropoulos’s Artists Under Hitler: Collaboration and Survival in Nazi Germany or The
Faustian Bargain: the Art World in Nazi Germany.
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must have degrees of aesthetic worth or interest in order to successfully persuade. In 1986,
he founded the Wolfsonian Foundation (in 1995 it became the Wolfsonian Museum of
Florida International University) to house his extensive art holdings and began publishing
The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts.248 Wolfson’s private art collection served
as the basis for the foundation and journal: he focused on British, German, Dutch, Italian,
and American paintings, posters, graphics, periodicals, and decorative objects created
between 1870 and 1945.249
The breadth and choice of the acquisitions across mediums, scale of production
(both one of a kind and mass-produced items), high art and popular culture makes the
Wolfson collection and the criteria that inspired it one of the first examples of what is now
commonly referred to as “visual culture.” It levels hierarchies of taste, training, audience,
and reception and considers the entirety of visual images in a larger socio-economic and
cultural context. Moreover, it argues that each of these domains embodies varying levels
of creative decisions, mastery of materials, and qualitative discernment. Nazi and Fascist
memorabilia make up the bulk of the collection. Comprised of artifacts, sculptures,
paintings, books, postcards, posters, medals, and household appliances, Wolfson’s
collection is unified not by style (though there is a preponderance of what can be called art
deco or machine aesthetic design in the arts of the interwar period), theme, or medium, but

Peyton Skipworth, “Mitchell Wolfson Jr.: Collecting for the Wolfsonian.” The Journal
of the Decorative Arts Society 1850 - the Present 30 (2006) 137. Accessed April 8, 2019.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41805889
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rather by the ways in which visual culture communicates its relationship to the political
ideologies and socio-economic factors whence it came.250
The youngest child of Frances and Mitchell Wolfson Sr., Micky Wolfson Jr. came
from a wealthy Jewish American family. His mother was an artist and activist and his father
built a career as an entrepreneur and philanthropist. 251 The Jr. Wolfson attended boarding
school and later Princeton University in New Jersey and Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C. 252 After graduate school, he joined the
foreign service in 1966 and later served as the U.S. Vice Consul in Genoa, Italy. 253
Following a short-lived marriage and a brief career organizing art exhibitions in Europe,
Wolfson devoted his life solely to the collecting of modernism, funded by the sale of his
father’s business in 1983.254 There are substantial holdings devoted to Art Nouveau or the
Italian Stile Libertà; but Wolfson soon understood that twentieth century mass politics and
design were both profoundly influenced by rapid technological advances. Perhaps most
importantly, the interwar period saw the advent of mass production. For these reasons Mr.
Wolfson was attracted to art-objects and artistic criteria that embodied the response to the
numerous changes occurring socially and politically.
Wolfson’s collection of formerly taboo items, namely those of a Nazi origin,
includes war posters (figure 19), banners (figure 20), uniforms, anti-Semitic posters, and

250John

Malcolm Brinnin, “Mitchell Wolfson, Jr.: The Man and His Mission.” The
Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts 10 (1988): 80.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1504020.
251 Maya Bell, "The Bazaar Journey of Micky Wolfson." South Florida Sun-Sentinel
(Deerfield Beach), August 22, 1993. Accessed September 5, 2020. https://www.sunsentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1993-08-22-9308060082-story.html.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
85

racist caricatures. It could easily be assumed that someone amassing a large collection of
these materials had neo-Nazi ties or sympathies; however, because Mr. Wolfson was both
Jewish and American, his purchase of these materials–and desire to seek them out–quelled
any fears. Some authors, such as the American scholar of Russian constructivism Victor
Margolin, commented that it was strange that a Jewish man collected Nazi and Fascist art,
but Wolfson’s background can readily explain his drive to gather these materials and make
them available for study.255 As Joel Hoffman explained:
Wolfson compellingly argues that the recording of history is necessarily prejudiced,
and no written account has provided a satisfactory explanation of Hitler’s rise to
power. Artifacts, on the contrary, he feels, ‘don’t lie,’ but rather hold the power to
provide answers to this and other historical conundrums.256
Wolfson himself stated “I’m not trying to influence or impose an interpretation on the
viewer’s encounter with the collection. I’m simply the agent of this encounter.” 257 His
interest in Nazi and Fascist objects lay in what they represented and how they represented
it. Driven by an educational mission, he argued for their display as artefacts of historical
importance.258 Reviewers of the Wolfsonian collection have stated that the fascination with
Nazi and fascist objects is “justified. . .because of his [Wolfson’s] missionary zeal to
present them as reminders of oppressive political ideologies.” 259 But Wolfson was also
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keen to show what he called “analogies,” that is, where overlaps occur in the means and
imagery of messaging. An early collector of Italian Fascist-era art, Wolfson understood
that modernist design, painting, and graphic arts thrived under Mussolini and thus
totalitarian art was not always equated with retrograde art. He also perceived the role of
propaganda in the art of the New Deal. In a 1992 newspaper interview, he explained his
motivations:
Never doubt that we have a mission and that we are revolutionaries. This
foundation is meant to influence the way people think about history and art;
we are resolved to make a difference. . . I’m didactic and I’m very interested
in analogies. And I don’t want to be fashionable —that’s why I chose the
word propaganda. I am determined to rid the world of oppression,
misfortune, and misinformation.260

The combination of ephemera and art challenged traditional art historical methodologies.
Although similar collections of ephemera existed in libraries and archives such as the
Library of Congress in Washington, DC or the Imperial War Museum in London, the term
“propaganda arts” made Wolfson a pioneer in the new fields of “visual culture” and
“material culture.”261 In the first edition of The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda
Arts, editor Pamela Johnson wrote of the journal and, in effect, the collection’s mission:
Within this journal, The Wolfson Foundation creates a forum for scholars
to explore decorative and propaganda arts, 1875-1956- ubiquitous arts that
shaped our parents and grandparents and, by extension, our own profound
emotions and thoughts. Social, cultural, and intellectual history are
implicated with art history. The journal will encompass a wide range of
theory as experts furnish, with special emphasis on international and crosscultural influences. Thus far, just one fact of our being is problematic: the
focus on propaganda. What do we mean by propaganda arts? A succinct
answer is, “art in the service of an idea or an ideology.” If that seems too
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general, remember, definitions are odious … Even more so with the upstart
of propaganda arts, only acknowledged in this century.262

Few people had earlier voiced the opinion that items of explicit propaganda, such as
posters, postcards, and banners, held aesthetic value–they were simply valued as
collectable items. What Micky Wolfson, his collection, and the subsequent journal did was
elevate these materials and create a forum for the discussion of their historical importance.
Scholars such as Peggy Loar have written about the cultural importance of the Wolfsonian
collection:
One of the ways in which a civilization defined itself is in its material
culture; its infrastructure, architecture, art, furnishings, tools, technologies,
ephemera. Through objects, cultures are recorded, providing us with
tangible evidence concerning transformations in values and politics.263

Although no one, including Wolfson, disputed the inherently evil and oppressive content
of Nazi propaganda, the scholars working with his collection and contributing to his
journal, analyzed how and why it was so convincing. Although Americans such as Captain
Gordon Gilkey and the organizers of Kunst im Dritten Reich had argued this same point,
Wolfson opened up the realm of aesthetics and the agency of artists and audiences.
Specifically, he moved the aesthetic issue beyond fine art to one of design: that the
collected objects served to represent the history of graphic design and decorative arts. In
assessing Wolfson’s collection, John Heskett discussed how it altered the previous
historiography of design: “Design histories of this period have separated the two phases
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on a very simplistic basis: the Weimar Republic is depicted as a flowering of modern design
that ended when Hitler came to power; the Third Reich is generally ignored.” 264 He
continued:
The assumption that the Nazi regime engendered only work of little value
is untenable, I would argue, since it completely underestimates two factors.
First, designs of high caliber continued to be produced in the Third Reich:
a reprehensible ideology does not necessarily produce inferior design and
creativity can flourish in evil conditions. Second, when used for political
ends, artifacts serve purposes reaching far beyond the form, function, and
meanings attributed to them in the processes and practices of design. 265

Heskett concluded that Wolfson’s collection formed the basis of one of the most informed
and complex analyses of the Third Reich’s deliberate aesthetic choices, choices that not
only yielded a unified propaganda platform designed to suit their specific political
ideologies, but one delivered precisely because of their visual appeal and sophistication.
Wolfson amassed his collection through sheer ingenuity, scavenging estate sales
and thrift shops and tracking down artists and their heirs across the globe. 266 Profiles on
the collector have noted that he often travels the world, talking his way into people’s homes
to see what they have. One profile from 1993 noted:
For him, every purchase is an adventure, every trip a voyage of
discovery…He would rather trek to an Indonesian village and talk a family
out of a rare book on the Dutch occupation than deal with an auction house.
It's too easy to browse through a catalog, circle an item and make a bid. His
first choice is to find an heir or the artist himself, go to his house, meet the
fellow, sit down and have tea and ask, "What's in your closets? What's under
your bed? What's over there?" He will open a cabinet and say, "I know you
have something for me. I know you're hiding something from me." . . . On
a typical outing, he would befriend the local barber, who would tell him
about so-and-so's mother who had this or that, and off he would go to knock
Ibid., 78. Margolin is quoting Heskett’s “Design in Inter-War Germany” in Designing
Modernity: The Arts of Reforms and Persuasion, 1885-1945, 257.
265 Ibid. quote from Heskett’s “Design in Inter-War Germany” in Designing Modernity:
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on the door. "And they let him in," says Lea Nickless, his collections
assistant. "I seldom see him fail when he puts his mind to something. He's
so single-minded, so strong-willed, so persuasive and charming. He knows
how to make things happen." 267

Wolfson’s equitable attitude toward objects of varying worth, the desire to learn, and the
realization that families held on to what might be considered taboo material, directed his
collecting.268 That Wolfson was able to travel the globe and collect these objects implies
that a number of people saw value–and shame–in these items, at least enough to keep them
in their attics or in the back of thrift stores. Despite Wolfson’s globetrotting ways and the
growing interest in his collection within the United States–as well as the related museum,
the Wolfsoniana, which he founded in Italy–there appears to be little attention paid to his
work within Germany.269 Wolfson certainly amassed some of the Nazi materials in his care
from within the FRG–numerous newspaper articles speak of his trips to Europe. 270
Undoubtedly, an America was able to rehabilitate Nazi art and propaganda under the value
system of visual culture precisely because the project did not unfold in Germany under the
auspices of a German collection.

267

Ibid.
Ibid.
269 Wolfson opened the Wolfsoniana in 2005. The museum is housed in a 17th century
villa and its collection encompasses “paintings, sculptures, furniture, glass, ceramics,
wrought iron, textiles, architectural projects (built and unbuilt), graphic design, political
and publicity posters and leaflets, books, periodicals and newspapers.” See Roderick
Conway Morris’s "Genoa is the New Home of Decorative Arts Collection." New York
Times, Dec 28, 2005, Late Edition (East Coast),
http://proxy.wexler.hunter.cuny.edu/login?url=https://www-proquestcom.proxy.wexler.hunter.cuny.edu/docview/433228083?accountid=27495 (accessed
October 28, 2020).
270 The provenance of many of his objects remains undocumented, asper a survey of the
on-line catalogue. That may well be due to the difficulty in establishing ownership for
ephemera.
268

90

Conclusion
When the 6,100 Nazi artworks were returned to the Federal Republic of Germany, the
government was at a loss for what to do with them. Instead of welcoming their return, the
FRG hid them in a warehouse with no plans for use or exhibition. Despite the growing
research conducted on the Nazi period and all of the voices and opinions which came out
of the historians’ dispute and the Ludwig controversy, the art of the Third Reich remained
concealed and largely ignored.
In 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany founded the Deutsches Historisches
Museum (German History Museum) in West Berlin. 271 A permanent location for the
museum was not established until after German reunification in 1990, when the buildings
and collections of the GDR’s Museum für Deutsche Geschichte (Museum of German
History) were transferred to the care of the Deutsches Historisches Museum. The museum
took over the historic Zeughaus, built in 1695, to create a permanent location in Berlin’s
Mitte district. It aimed to encompass all of German history with the hopes of developing
a unified national heritage after German reunification. The creation of a national museum
marked a new moment of reflection, as the FRG had remained wary of all notions of
nationalism following the fall of the Third Reich. 272 In order to move past the negative
connotations associated with interest or pride in the German past, a range of scholars and
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Museums in Europe. Conference proceedings from EuNaMus, European National
Museums: Identity Politics, the Uses of the Past and the European Citizen. Linköping
University Electronic Press. Accessed October 10, 2019.
http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/083/009/ecp12083009.pdf, 55-70. This paper was part of a
conference presenting the findings of a three-year study of 37 European national
museums funded by the European Union. For a breakdown of the project and its
objectives please see: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/244305/reporting.
272 Ibid., 58.
271

91

scientists worked together on narrative installations and exhibitions that created an
atmosphere of reflection and remembrance. 273
The culture of remembrance, compared to the culture of atonement, was a result of
the nation’s complicated history with its Nazi past, and evolved in the decade following
reunification. It led to increased public access to National Socialist cultural material.
Instead of fearing Nazi imagery, scholars and academics used it to keep certain memories
and lessons relevant. In 2007, the government transferred the care of the German War Art
collection, along with a number of other Nazi items in their warehouse, to the Deutsches
Historiches Museum. Today, many of these artworks and objects are on view as a part of
the museum’s permanent exhibition: Deutsche Geschichte vom Mittelalter bis zum
Mauerfall (German History from the Middle Ages to the Fall of the Berlin Wall) (figures
21, 22, 23). The displays are intended not just for Germans but for tourists and citizens of
other countries, as befitting the re-unified city of Berlin’s new international status.274
By placing the art produced under National Socialism within the context of an
exhibition on German history, the museum nonetheless passed a value judgment. Only in
the past ten years has Nazi art been exhibited in German art museums. In 2012 the Haus
der Kunst opened the cultural policy exhibition Histories in Conflict: Haus der Kunst and
the Ideological Uses of Art, 1937-1955. This exhibition explored the legacy of the
museum, from the center of the National Socialist art world to its rehabilitation in the
postwar. Most importantly the exhibition served to showcase how the museum has
confronted its tainted history: through the 1996 implementation of a historical documents
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installation, publications, the opening of Historical archives in 2005, and the establishment
of the HDK internet database in 2011.
Seventy-five years after the fall of the Third Reich, National Socialist visual culture
remains a contested subject, especially in Germany. Articles such as Anna Larkin’s “Nazi
art on show: Is Germany ready to look again?,” published on DW.com, highlight the storied
history of Nazi art within Germany and the ongoing tensions surrounding the subject. 275
Despite the continued taboo of Nazi imagery and the careful presentation of Nazi visual
culture, it still has the power to instill fear and violence. Take for example the use of the
swastika and the rise of neo-Nazism in the GDR (and in present day-throughout Europe
and America): no symbol of the Third Reich was, or is, more feared. Although studies have
shown that many early neo-Nazis in the GDR did not understand what the swastika meant,
they knew it was illegal and spray-painting it on buildings was an act of rebellion.276 The
fact that the GDR did not undergo an extensive denazification program (the view was that
communism had saved Germany and members of the Communist resistance were made
heroes), resulted in an absence of denazification education. Citizens of the GDR were not
taught why Nazism was evil, only that it was. This lack of education led to the rise of neoNazism in Germany and abroad. Today, as neo-Nazism continues to grow not only in
Germany but also Europe and the United States, the importance of understanding the power
of images is all the more relevant. Take for example, the twenty-nine Berlin police officers
who were suspended in September 2020 for disseminating 126 Nazi or violent images,
including pictures of swastikas and a doctored image of a current-day refugee in a gas
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chamber. 277 In 2020, the swastika remains a highly charged symbol that stands for the
violent, racist ideologies heralded by the Third Reich. Given the prevalence of neo-Nazism,
it is easy to wonder if Germany, or the world, really is ready to look at Nazi art again, and
if so, perhaps, for the foreseeable future, audiences will need to be made ready.
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